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In recent decisions across an array of civil procedure and federal courts law
settings, the Supreme Court has rearticulated the terms of access to the federal
courts. In these cases, addressing standing, pleading standards, class actions,
and bankruptcy jurisdiction, the Court has relied on an account of the judicial
role centered on resolving disputes that stem from personal harms, and has
shaped procedural doctrine around claims that take that form. I argue that the
Court's approach reflects a common law model of the federal courts, a model
whose renewed prominence at the procedural stage is striking in an era
increasingly characterized by legislative and regulatory frameworks. I contend
that the Court's emphasis on a common law account presents a distinct model
of a common law court in a regulatory world The Article presents this model
and its invocation in the recent cases, and discusses its implications for the
enforcement of substantive law. In particular, I suggest that this approach
shapes a judicial orientation apart from rather than alongside the political
branches, minimizing the judicial role in facilitating the enforcement of the
law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal courts have long been called upon to take part in securing
enforcement of the law.' A number of recurring hurdles complicate efforts to
realize the goals motivating legal enactments, such as executive disinterest in or
insufficient resources for enforcement, the cost of bringing claims exceeding the
potential recovery, and plaintiffs lacking the information needed to support
claims at the time of suit. In response to these obstacles, Congress has sought to
promote enforcement of statutory schemes by regularly including private
enforcement provisions in regulatory statutes. These provisions give private
actors authority (and often financial incentives) to act as "private attorney
generals" and bring suit in federal (or state) court to enforce the law, either in
addition to or instead of enforcement by government actors. 2 The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure likewise advance the goal of enforcement by easing the
bringing of claims in the federal courts, for example through provisions for
discovery and for aggregation. 3
The widespread reliance on these enforcement mechanisms reflects the fact
that enacting laws does not ensure they will be implemented 4 and reveals an
effort to make use of the federal courts in the enforcement project. In pursuing
this approach, political actors position the courts as co-participants in the work
of governing. For this process to work, however, the federal courts must be
willing to play this role. An array of recent decisions indicate that the current
Supreme Court is not committed to doing so.
In order to understand and assess the tension between the Court's recent
rulings and legislative efforts to promote private enforcement through the
1 The two primary roles traditionally attributed to the federal courts are the common
law function of resolving disputes between individuals and saying what the Constitution
means. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 72-76 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing "dispute resolution" and "law
declaration" models of the federal courts); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication:
The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1365-71 (1973) (setting out "private rights" and
"special function" models).
2 See generally SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND
PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010) (discussing private enforcement provisions).
3 See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
4 See J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in
Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1142 (2012) (noting that "our system of
regulation is only as good as the enforcement mechanisms underlying it"); Margaret H.
Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 782 (2011) ("The practical
meaning of federal law depends in large part on the choices legislators make about
enforcement.").
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courts, this Article examines the conception of the judicial role that the Supreme
Court has relied upon in a series of civil procedure and federal courts law
decisions over the past few years. A close review of the Court's opinions-
across contexts of standing, pleading standards, class actions, and bankruptcy
jurisdiction-reveals an idea of the fundamental institutional mission5 of the
federal courts as resolving claims stemming from common law or common law-
like disputes presenting personal harms, and indicates that the Court is shaping
procedure and justiciability doctrine around that account. This model, which I
characterize as a common law model because it is structured around the
resolution of common law-type claims, constitutes the basic vision of the
federal courts the Court has used to guide its analysis where it has found
interpretive space, whether in applying constitutional law or statutes or the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In short, when considering contested
questions about access to and the operations of the federal courts, this common
law model is the vision of the judicial role from which the Court's reasoning
has proceeded.
This common law model reflects a traditional conception of litigation
involving interpersonal or individual-state disputes, such as tort, contract, and
property claims, in which a party seeks a remedy for a harm they have
suffered. 6 The model envisions that type of personal harm (which nowadays
need not stem from an actual common law claim) as the key to federal court
access. 7 But this common law orientation, notwithstanding its historical
pedigree, is in some tension with the contemporary world of legislation and
administrative governing, a world that presents significant departures from the
common law approach. Among them: the common law reflects an accretive
process of law articulated by courts based on precedent, while statutes embody
the directives of a governing authority;8 the common law typically presents ex
post frameworks responding to harms, whereas regulatory models often seek to
5 By "institutional mission," I mean "an identifiable purpose or shared normative
goal." Howard Gillman, The Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): Interpretive
Institutionalism and the Analysis of Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT
DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 65, 79 (Comell W. Clayton &
Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
6 See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv.
L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1976) (observing that "[i]n our received tradition, the lawsuit is a
vehicle for settling disputes between private parties about private rights").
7 See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 339 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (indicating that
both standing and mootness doctrines "have equivalently deep roots in the common-law
understanding, and hence the constitutional understanding, of what makes a matter
appropriate for judicial disposition").
8 See KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT 178 (2004) (suggesting that "political development in America shows a
movement from prescriptive to positive lawmaking; that is, from finding the law, based on
precedent, in the stylized manner of courts, to making the law, based on present
circumstances, in the stylized manner of legislatures").
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prevent harm ex ante as well;9 and the common law tends to focus on the
individual rights-holder (or duty-bearer),' 0 while legislation can be pitched at
the aggregate or societal level. As these differences indicate, the divide between
these frameworks does not simply reflect the contents of particular doctrines but
addresses the organizing logic of the legal system. Because the legislative
model is premised on the efforts of political actors to achieve public ends
through law, it aligns well with a judicial role that allows for facilitating the
enforcement of the law, as opposed to a common law model centered on the
remedy of individual harms."
While American law has continued to make use of common law elements
even as it has adopted statutory and administrative frameworks,12 the Court's
reliance on a common law model in the recent cases not only collides with the
legislative provision for judicial involvement but also presents tensions
surrounding the use of the common law framework itself. The common law
encompasses an array of elements, including a distinct methodology, a certain
domain of application, and the content of common law doctrines. These
elements, which are interdependent under the traditional common law system,
have diverged under current practice,' 3 raising questions about the relationship
of the common law to the federal courts today. In particular, we should consider
whether a common law model should continue to guide the Court's analysis of
9 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 375,
377-80 (2007) (discussing the FDA's ex ante model of regulation, and emphasizing that
"[t]he key is that both ex ante and ex post review are essential parts of the regulatory
model-sometimes operating in tandem, sometimes as substitutes").
10 See ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 13-14 (1921) (discussing the
"extreme individualism" of the common law and noting that it "tries questions of the highest
social import as mere private controversies between John Doe and Richard Roe").
11 Cf Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REv. 937, 937-
38 (1975) (sketching a roughly similar divide over the judicial role, distinguishing a Conflict
Resolution model of the federal courts from a "Behavior Modification Model" which "sees
the courts and civil process as a way of altering behavior by imposing costs on a person").
Scott's Behavior Modification Model, which "focuses on the defendant, not on the plaintiff,"
id. at 939, is ultimately a form of governing in light of its efforts to promote certain ends,
and is somewhat analogous to the facilitational role of the federal courts I describe here.
12 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARv. L. REV.
421, 425-26 (1987) ("One of the greatest ironies of modem administrative law-an area
whose origins lay in a substantial repudiation of the common law-is its continuing reliance
on common law categories."); Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?, 77 CAL. L.
REv. 455, 456 (1989) (book review) (noting that "[a]lthough the legislative component in
contracts, torts, and property may have increased in recent years, the degree of judicial
lawmaking surrounding nominally statutory areas of law has increased more than
commensurately, and as a result, common law method flourishes as it has never before"
(footnote omitted)).
13 I detail this point infra Part IV.
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questions of judicial access even as the common law plays a diminished role for
other purposes.14
While the Court's shaping of judicial access by reference to an account of
common law-type harms is familiar from cases involving constitutional and
other claims against state actors, especially in standing jurisprudence,15 the
emphasis on this model in cases involving efforts by private actors to enforce
the law against other private actors presents distinct concerns. The counter-
majoritarian anxieties that accompany judicial oversight of state action have
motivated an array of strategies to cabin judicial engagement and inhibit the
courts from acting as a "Council of Revision."16 These concerns differ
markedly from the hesitations surrounding judicial participation alongside the
political branches in the enforcement of regulatory schemes. The Court's
account of the judicial role calls for an assessment specific to this context.
The common law orientation invoked by the Court in the recent cases thus
spotlights crucial questions about the judicial role in the twenty-first century
regulatory state. A common law court operating within a common law world
differs markedly from a common law court acting in a legal landscape
characterized by regulatory law and aggregate harms.17 I contend that the
Court's reliance on a common law model in response to claims involving the
14 For an example of this tension, compare Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287
(2001) (Scalia, J., for the Court) ("'Raising up causes of action where a statute has not
created them may be a proper function for common-law courts, but not for federal
tribunals."' (quoting Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350,
365 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))), with Honig v.
Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 340 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that previous decisions
"chose to refer directly to the traditional, fundamental limitations upon the powers of
common-law courts, rather than referring to Art. III which in turn adopts those limitations
through terms ('The judicial Power'; 'Cases'; 'Controversies') that have virtually no
meaning except by reference to that tradition").
15 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization ofPublic Law, 88 COLUM.
L. REv. 1432, 1433 (1988) (arguing that "[r]ecent and still quite tentative innovations in the
law of standing have started to push legal doctrine in the direction of what we may call a
private-law model of standing" under which "a nineteenth century private right is a predicate
for judicial intervention" and that "as a result, courts may not redress the systemic or
probabilistic harms that Congress intended regulatory schemes to prevent").
16 Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1449 (2011) ("Few
exercises of the judicial power are more likely to undermine public confidence in the
neutrality and integrity of the Judiciary than one which casts the Court in the role of a
Council of Revision, conferring on itself the power to invalidate laws at the behest of anyone
who disagrees with them."). I discuss this passage infra text accompanying notes 63-67. For
a prominent early articulation of these issues, see Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The
Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40, 79 (1961) (discussing "the wide area of choice open
to the Court in deciding whether, when, and how much to adjudicate," in particular "the
devices for avoiding adjudication").
17See HOwARD SCHWEBER, THE CREATION OF AMERICAN COMMON LAW, 1850-1880:
TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF CITIZENSHIP 28 (2004) (observing that
"to retain old doctrines in the face of different circumstances is, itself, a choice that changes
the meaning and function of a rule or decision").
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private enforcement of regulatory provisions' 8 or addressing mass harms serves
to delineate a distinct role for the federal courts today. Much as the Supreme
Court labored in the twentieth century to structure the courts' relationship with
administrative agencies,19 and just as the development of constitutional rights
by the Warren Court propelled reassessments of the judicial role in overseeing
state action,20 I argue that the recent decisions present the Court working to
calibrate its stance toward the evolving forms of litigation of our era. By
effectively demanding common law-type harms in order to access the federal
courts, the Supreme Court fashions the federal court as a common law court in a
regulatory world. This model is not anachronistic or confused but rather
embodies an orientation that situates the federal courts apart from-and
opposite to-the political branches rather than as a co-participant in the work of
governing.
As this synopsis suggests, my aim here is primarily analytical, seeking to
explain both the through-line connecting the recent dramatic rulings across civil
procedure and federal courts settings as well as the ways the Court deploys the
rules structuring itself as an institution as a means of calibrating not only its
own role but in turn the broader operation of governing the American state. I
accordingly evaluate these developments not from the standpoint of the
outcomes of the individual cases or their doctrinal implications for civil
procedure and federal courts law, but in terms of the vision of the judicial role
the Court invokes and its relationship to the practice of governing. In doing so, I
argue that the recurring indications of a common law court orientation speak to
a distinct vision, one likely to shape future rulings.
I seek to call attention to the practical implications of this orientation as
well. As noted, legislative attempts to promote the implementation of federal
law through the courts reveal a persisting inclination that judicial participation
18Because I focus here on the relationship between the Court's procedural rulings and
the government's efforts to secure enforcement of the law, I limit my discussion of private
enforcement provisions to those in which the private enforcers are acting on behalf of the
government in its sovereign capacity rather than remedying a proprietary injury suffered by
the government, and therefore do not discuss the treatment of qui tam provisions. See infra
note 217 for explanation of this distinction.
19 See generally Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the
Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REv. 399 (2007) (exploring
evolving relationship between courts and agencies in the New Deal era); Thomas W. Merrill,
Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of
Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939 (2011) (detailing the development of the
appellate review model of administrative law in the early twentieth century).
2 0 See Chayes, supra note 6 (examining the role of courts in light of the shifting public
law litigation forms of the modem era); Monaghan, supra note 1, at 1363-64 (developing
inquiry on "the conditions under which constitutional determinations should be made: who
may obtain constitutional declarations and when"); Sarah Staszak, Institutions, Rulemaking,
and the Politics ofJudicial Retrenchment, 24 STUD. AM. POL. DEv. 168 (2010) (examining
institutional retrenchment of the judiciary since the 1960s through history of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
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is crucial for the project of enforcing the law. But legislators (and
commentators) have not adequately addressed the Court's vision of the federal
courts' role-and the compatibility of that account with the project of
implementing substantive law. As a result, before relying on private suits as a
means of enforcing legislative schemes or proposing better ways for the federal
courts to achieve the goals of the law, we should consider whether promoting
the attainment of the ends of the law is treated by the Supreme Court as within
the role of the federal courts, and think about what to do if the answer is no.
I begin in Part II with some background, presenting the recent cases as the
latest manifestation of a recurring dynamic in which the federal courts calibrate
procedural and justiciability practices to shape the judicial role in the work of
American governing. The historical discussion is illustrative rather than
comprehensive, with the aim of highlighting that the Court does not act in
isolation and that it has regularly framed procedural doctrines in response to
external political and societal developments. The Court's analogous project
today is not unprecedented, and recognizing the historical parallels allows us to
evaluate that project on its own terms.
I engage the Court's decisions in Part III, examining recent rulings on
standing, pleading standards, class actions, and bankruptcy jurisdiction in order
to extract the underlying account of the Court's institutional mission that serves
to shape the outcomes of these cases. The cases indicate that the Court has
relied on a claim of personal harm as the basis of access to the federal courts.
This Part details the recurring emphasis on this model in the context of private
actors advancing claims against other private actors, shaping a law of courts
oriented around a common law-style model of personal harm.
Part IV addresses the relationship of the law of courts with practices of
governing, focusing on the implications of the Court's developing approach for
the enforcement of federal law. This Part explores the mechanisms and judicial
treatment of private enforcement provisions before assessing the practical and
structural implications threatened by the recent decisions and their motivating
ideas. I contend that the privileging of common law-like claims shapes a
preference for public enforcement mechanisms, and threatens to constrain the
federal government's capacity to govern effectively in settings that do not yield
common law-style claims.
In Part V, I address the Court's common law-based model of the role of the
federal courts, assessing the meaning of this model in an era moving away from
the common law on the substance of the law and to some extent at the level of
method as well. I argue that the Court's recent decisions shape a model of a
common law court in a regulatory world, a role that orients the federal courts
apart from the political branches, rather than working alongside them in the
practice of governing.
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II. CIVIL LITIGATION AS A FORM OF GOVERNANCE
Throughout American history, civil litigation has served not only as a
means of enforcing agreements and compensating those who are harmed, but
also as a form of governance. 21 In this Part, I present an overview of the
dynamics of governing through courts, focusing on how the federal courts have
shaped this process. I emphasize the ways the law of courts (encompassing civil
procedure and federal courts law) has shifted alongside and in response to
substantive developments in the law. The basic point here is that federal and
state courts have calibrated the form and extent of their participation in
governing based on ideas of the judicial role.22
A. Governing Through Courts
The examination and explication of the American state has come to be a
significant scholarly concern. Political scientists addressing issues of American
political development, along with historians and legal scholars, have shown that
while the United States diverges from the model of the powerful central state
familiar from Europe, a strong state-increasingly, a strong central state-can
be observed throughout American history.23 Significantly, this governing
authority has taken form in large part through law and the courts rather than
through administration or bureaucracy.24
Historians have shown that in the pre-Civil War period the common law
instantiated a framework of governance. By "governance," I refer to the efforts
of state authority to achieve certain ends, whether through direct regulation, the
provision of incentives for certain conduct, participation in the market, or
2 1 See generally ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF
LAW 3 (2001) (discussing American reliance on "adversarial legalism," meaning
"policymaking, policy implementation, and dispute resolution by means of lawyer-
dominated litigation").
22 Cf Susan Bandes, Erie and the History of the One True Federalism, 110 YALE L.J.
829, 829 (2001) (reviewing EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000) and emphasizing Purcell's reminder that "only
recently have federal courts scholars begun to consider the extent to which their subject is
the product of distinctive historical developments").
23 See Desmond King & Robert C. Lieberman, Ironies of State Building: A
Comparative Perspective on the American State, 61 WORLD POL. 547, 547 (2009) (noting
that "[t]he American state is, in a variety of domains and through unexpected mechanisms,
more potent as an authoritative rule maker, national standardizer, and manager of the
nation's affairs than earlier accounts had generally concluded"). See generally BRIAN
BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT: THE MYSTERY OF NATIONAL AUTHORITY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2009) (discussing development of strong national state).
2 4 See JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN HISTORIES OF
AMERICAN LAW 211-78 (2007) (discussing why "courts and private institutions [have]
played central roles in the kinds of social programs that comparable western nation-states
perform through public administrative bureaucracies," id at 214).
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otherwise.25 As examples, William Novak elucidates the practice of regulation
pursuant to common law models based on an ideal of furthering "the people's
welfare," 26 Howard Schweber details the process by which courts developed the
common law in the mid-nineteenth century as a means of promoting "a vision
of technology-driven progress," 27 and Jerry Mashaw notes the place of the
courts in early forms of administration, such as common law actions against
federal administrative officials, as well as the "commandeering" of state courts
in the enforcement of early regulatory statutes.28 Such analyses reveal the ways
in which state and federal courts,29 working largely through the common law
and enforcing the police power of the state, served to shape regulation in
nineteenth-century America through a distinctly judicial form.30 In short,
"[u]ntil the emergence of our patchwork schemes of federal regulation during
the progressive era, only courts seemed to have the independence, geographic
reach, and institutional resources to govern effectively on a statewide or
national basis."31
The development of the modern administrative state accelerates after the
Civil War and the Reconstruction period. This era marks the moment when
governing authority begins to shift from the state and local level to the federal
government, following the Civil War and Reconstruction and the greater
intertwining of American society aided by developments like the telegraph and
25 See Scott Burris, Michael Kempa & Clifford Shearing, Changes in Governance: A
Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REv. 1, 3 (2008)
("Governance may be defined as organized efforts to manage the course of events in a social
system. Governance is about how people exercise power to achieve the ends they desire, so
disputes about ends are tied inextricably to assessments of governance means."); Orly Lobel,
The Renew Deal: The Fall ofRegulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal
Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344 (2004) ("Governance signifies the range of activities,
functions, and exercise of control by both public and private actors in the promotion of
social, political, and economic ends.").
2 6 WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 1-2 (1996).
27 See SCHWEBER, supra note 17, at 2.
28 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist
Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1321-33 (2006).
29 Because the federal courts did not have federal question jurisdiction until 1875
(except for a short period in 1801-02), the judicial role in governance in the pre-Civil War
period primarily involved state courts. See Kermit L. Hall, The Courts, 1790-1920, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA, VOLUME II: THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY,
1789-1920, at 108 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher L. Tomlins eds., 2008) (noting that
"during the nineteenth century the great body of day-to-day justice took place in the state
trial and appellate courts, not the federal courts").
30 Additional studies on this topic are discussed in Harry N. Scheiber, Private Rights
and Public Power: American Law, Capitalism, and the Republican Polity in Nineteenth-
Century America, 107 YALE L.J. 823, 829-40 (1997) (reviewing NOVAK, supra note 26).
31 Daniel R. Ernst, Law and American Political Development, 1877-1938, 26 REv. AM.
HIST. 205, 209 (1998).
2013] 293
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
the railroad. 32 The establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission in
1887 is traditionally seen as the first emergence of the modem administrative
agencies, leading to the development of administrative law.33 While this era
does not reveal a single unified trajectory of events, encompassing various and
sometimes competing changes, 34 the period presents a consistently increasing
governance role for the federal courts.
Developments in these years yielded a "dramatic and controversial
expansion of federal judicial power,"35 in both explicit and more subtle ways.
The formal sphere of federal court authority increased due to the grant of
federal question jurisdiction in 1875, the expansion of removal the same year,
and the introduction of the Circuit Courts of Appeals in 1891.36 Commentators
have highlighted the way these and related developments "redirect[ed] civil
litigation involving national commercial interests out of state courts and into the
federal judiciary."37 Along with these migrations of decision-making authority,
the treatment of a number of areas of substantive doctrine-including oversight
of state and local government and regulation of commerce-further shifted
governance capacities to the federal courts.38 In short, the federal courts
32 See NOVAK, supra note 26, at 239-48 (sketching these developments); ORREN &
SKOWRONEK, supra note 8, at 179 (noting that "the post-Civil War Congress entered into the
boldest and most contentious period of its history by producing a spate of legislation to
expand national power at the expense of the states").
3 3 See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 13 (2012) (noting that "there is
no denying the conventional view, particularly in the legal academy, that the American
national administrative state, and with it federal administrative law, emerged with the late
nineteenth-century passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887"); Robert L. Rabin,
Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (1986)
(indicating that with the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887,
"[t]he modern age of administrative government had begun").
34 See BALOGH, supra note 23, at 14 (noting that "no period in America's history was
less representative of America's past than the brief era that stretched from the end of
Reconstruction in 1877 through the panic of 1893").
35 Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their
Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 511
(2002).
36 See William E. Forbath, Politics, State-Building, and the Courts, 1870-1920, in
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 655-56 (discussing these developments).
37 Gillman, supra note 35, at 517.
38 To provide a few illustrative examples: Edward Purcell discusses the ways in which
the Court's shifting construction of the term "state" "stretched the power of the federal
judiciary over the actions of state and local governments." Edward A. Purcell Jr., Some
Horwitzian Themes in the Law and History of the Federal Courts, in TRANSFORMATIONS IN
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY II: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MORTON J. HORWITZ, 271, 279-81
(Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2010) [hereinafter TRANSFORMATIONS].
William Novak explains that "[o]ne of the most important developments in the regulation of
economic activity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and a perfect example
of the creative force of law in the construction of the American regulatory state, was the
legal invention of the idea of the public utility." William J. Novak, Law and the Social
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amassed authority in these years from both state courts and political and
bureaucratic actors, acting through both public and private litigation, and
assisted in this process by a national bar. 39 William Forbath details the work of
courts
to define and redefine the rules and standards governing much of social and
economic life, leaving many areas of twentieth-century social policy and social
provision that other nations were assigning to public bureaucracies in the hands
of common law judges, attorneys, and private bureaucratic institutions, like
employers and insurance companies.40
The role of federal courts continued to evolve in the twentieth century.
Constitutional law plays a part here, with the so-called "Shift in Time" marking
a move away from aggressive enforcement of the Commerce Clause in the New
Deal era. This period likewise marks the emergence of the contemporary
framework of administrative law, and the elaboration of the relationship
between federal courts and administrative agencies. 1938 also presents the
removal of the federal courts from the general common law field in Erie and
(on the same day) the toe-dipping in the contemporary form of protection of
individual rights in Carolene Products.41 These moves were elements of the
emerging focus for the federal courts in protecting individual rights and
overseeing government action, a role that accelerated with the Brown decision
and the Warren Court in the 1950s and 60s, and the evolution of administrative
law through the 1970s. While these developments undoubtedly reflect changes
in American governing and political culture more broadly, we see that the role
of the courts in shifting forms of governance evolves as well, yielding different
models of substantive law and new procedural practices.
Control of American Capitalism, 60 EMORY L.J. 377, 399 (2010). Michael Collins has
highlighted the Court's relocating, in the 1896 Term in particular, of general law limitations
on states to the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, meaning that they could be
invoked not only by out-of-staters proceeding in diversity, but by state residents bringing
claims under federal question jurisdiction as well. See Michael G. Collins, October Term,
1896-Embracing Due Process, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 71 (2001).
39 See Ernst, supra note 31, at 212-13; William E. Forbath, Courting the State: An
Essay for Morton Horwitz, in TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 38, at 70, 76 (making this
point).
40 Forbath, supra note 36, at 695.
41 See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). See also PURCELL, supra note 22, at 3 (arguing
that "Erie was an integral part of [Justice Brandeis's] long-term effort to adapt the court
system of the states and the nation to the demands of a new interstate society" and that the
decision was intended "not only to terminate the 'federal general common law' but also to
cabin more generally the lawmaking powers of the national courts in a variety of cognate
areas").
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B. The Evolving Law of Courts
As doctrines of substantive law have evolved, reflecting changing
conceptions and practices of governing, the Court has reshaped rules and
practices of procedure and justiciability to calibrate the judicial role alongside. I
present here a suggestive, though certainly not exhaustive, narrative of moves in
this area analogous to those I argue are at play in the cases today.
In the late nineteenth century, as Edward Purcell has shown, the federal
courts reshaped elements of diversity jurisdiction in ways that allowed national
corporations to be heard in federal, rather than state, court,42 while limiting
federal court availability for other types of suits. 43 The Court also developed in
this era its use of the injunction, famously in labor disputes, as a means of
organizing judicial oversight.44 Further, the Court introduced the Ex Parte
Young doctrine to allow for review of the constitutionality of state action
consistent with state sovereign authority. 45 In these settings, we see the Court
reworking jurisdictional and procedural forms alongside developments in both
substantive law and the politics and society of the time with the effect of
establishing a distinct role for the federal courts.46
42 See Purcell, supra note 38, at 272-74 (explaining that in the early 1890s, "[a]cross a
range of issues, [the Court] began consistently to broaden the scope of diversity jurisdiction,
allowing corporate defendants ever-greater opportunities to remove actions to the federal
courts," id at 273).
43 See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Ex Parte Young and the Transformation of the Federal
Courts, 1890-1917, 40 U. TOL. L. REv. 931, 951 (2009) ("Believing that future federal-law
challenges to regulatory efforts would likely bring a 'great flood of litigation' to the national
courts, and recognizing that those suits would henceforth usually be brought under federal-
question jurisdiction, the Court sought to offset anticipated docket growth by systematically
and selectively narrowing the scope of diversity jurisdiction." (footnote omitted)).
44See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT 59-97 (1991) (discussing practice of "Government by Injunction" and
indicating that "[c]ourts cast aside customary limits on the purpose and scope of injunctions
to accommodate the injunction's new role as a mode of lawmaking and law enforcement in
industrial cities and regions," id. at 62); Purcell, supra note 43, at 945-47 (discussing the
"expansion of federal equity jurisdiction" and use of injunctions in this era).
45 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); PURCELL, supra note 22, at 43 (discussing
Young and explaining that "[b]y avoiding the 'well-pleaded complaint' rule, the decision
allowed challengers to control the choice of forum and force states to defend their actions in
the national courts," id. at 1456).
46 See Purcell, supra note 43, at 967-68 (arguing that "the enduring achievement of the
turn-of-the-century Court was not political or economic but institutional" as "it expanded the
scope and content of federal law, strengthened the ability of the federal courts to enforce that
law, and established more firmly the primacy of the federal judiciary in authoritatively
construing a supreme national law").
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This dynamic recurs in the events of the twentieth century. As Steven
Winter47 and Cass Sunstein have argued,48 and Daniel Ho and Erica Ross have
confirmed empirically, 49 the development of the modem doctrine of standing
during the 1930s by Justices traditionally associated with liberal positions
served as a means of keeping the more conservative federal courts away from
New Deal legislation. Standing doctrine formally structures the role of the
federal courts in elaborating a constitutional rule governing when the courts can
oversee state action, thereby limiting the territory of judicial oversight.50 These
standing rules developed alongside early doctrines of administrative law,
reflecting a broad effort to structure the judicial relationship to the work of
governing in the emerging administrative state. As with the late-nineteenth-
century developments, these doctrines worked to support the efforts of the
national government, limiting to some extent intervention in the work of
administrative agencies.
In this same period, the procedural practice of the federal courts was
remodeled by non-judicial actors as well, with the enactment of the Rules
Enabling Act of 1934 and the subsequent development of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.51 Commentators have elucidated the ways in which the Federal
Rules have altered-or allowed for the alteration of-the role of the federal
courts, sparking a move from trials to dispositive interim rulings and granting
judges enhanced equity powers, as well as empowering lawyers in the litigation
process. 52 Paul Frymer suggests that: perhaps the most important event in the
47 Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance,
40 STAN. L. REv. 1371, 1441-57 (1988) (discussing Justice Brandeis and Justice Frankfurter
"trying to develop doctrines of jurisdictional limitation").
48 Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1437 (arguing that "courts favorably disposed toward the
New Deal reformation developed doctrines of standing, ripeness, and reviewability largely
to insulate agency decisions from judicial intervention").
49 Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine? An
Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921-2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591, 596 (2010)
(contending that "cases from the 1930s and early 1940s provide substantial support for
[Winter's and Sunstein's] thesis" and that "[t]he contrast between the sharp conservative
valence of the post-1950 period and the liberal valence of the New Deal era provides striking
evidence for progressive use, if not invention, of the standing doctrine during the New Deal
period").
50 For discussion of the Court's application of standing doctrine in a context where
judicial oversight has been treated as desirable, see Saul Zipkin, Democratic Standing, 26
J.L. & POL. 179 (2011),
5128 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act
of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015 (1982) (detailing the history leading to the enactment of
the Rules Enabling Act).
52 See Ernst, supra note 31, at 211 (noting that "it took the thoroughgoing reforms of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1938) to make today's 'managerial judges' a
possibility"); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 912 (1987) (arguing
that "an historical examination of the evolution of the Federal Rules reveals that rules of
equity prevailed over common law procedure").
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courts' eventual capacity to conduct civil rights policy successfully was not the
heralded 1938 footnote in Carolene Products5 3 but the reforms to the federal
rules of civil procedure that passed through Congress in the same year.54 The
Federal Rules facilitated the bringing of claims by individual litigants, easing
the process of private enforcement of regulatory programs,55 and further
promoting judicial involvement in the work of governing.
Standing doctrine evolved in the 1970s and 80s into the form familiar
today, largely in response to developments in substantive law, such as
broadened constitutional rights and the advance of administrative law.56 The
heightened protection of rights in the Warren Court era led to claims seeking
judicial oversight of numerous state and federal practices. 57 In particular, this
era witnessed the growth in judicial monitoring of state institutions based on
systemic constitutional violations such as school desegregation and prison
conditions, through the use of structural injunctions and other remedies, a trend
which sparked a corresponding backlash against the broad equitable powers of
the federal courts.58 Further in this period, the federal courts saw the rise of
class action claims, following from the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, and the
ensuing push-and-pull over the judicial role in this setting, eventually leading to
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 and the broadening of diversity
jurisdiction and the federal judicial sphere. 59
53 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
54 Paul Frymer, Acting When Elected Officials Won't: Federal Courts and Civil Rights
Enforcement in U.S. Labor Unions, 1935-85, 97 AM. POL. SC. REV. 483, 486 (2003).
5 5 See Staszak, supra note 20, at 176 ("During the civil rights era the rules [of civil
procedure] were increasingly used as a tool for opening the door to more litigants and to a
wider range of cases."); Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1906 (1989)
("Few disagree that the Federal Rules were intended by their drafters to open wide the
courthouse doors.").
56 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95
(1983); Assoc. of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); see also
Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REv. 1131, 1182-98
(2009) (suggesting that the Court's development of standing in the 1970s, and movement
away from the "standing for the public" model, reflected its discomfort with "the
proliferation of 'public interest' suits," id. at 1198); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1723-47 (1975) (discussing
treatment of standing in administrative law).
57 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation:
Notes on the Jurisprudence ofLyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1984) (noting that "[t]he era
of the public lawsuit began with Brown v. Board ofEducation").
5 For contemporary discussions of these developments, see Abram Chayes, Foreword:
Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1982); Chayes, supra note
6; Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1979); William A.
Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91
YALE L.J. 635 (1982).
59 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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The common thread across these developments is not so much an
expanding as a reshaping judicial role, calibrating the work and domain of the
federal courts to the challenges of the twentieth-century American state,
providing for certain forms of monitoring of state and administrative action, and
facilitating private enforcement of substantive law. From an institutional
perspective, we see the Court continuing to adjust the rules of access and
operation that define its institutional identity, employing the tools available to it
in combination with an evolving vision of the judicial mission to reorient the
position of the federal courts in relation to a changing legal and political
environment. Each of these calibrations would in turn influence the
development of the legal and political environment the courts confronted and
thus provides the starting point for subsequent moves.
Much as the heightened prominence of standing requirements as a hurdle
for those challenging state action in the late twentieth century served to limit
somewhat and shape the settings in which federal courts would oversee the
regulatory or legislative process, and the shifts in diversity jurisdiction in the
late nineteenth century and the exit from federal general common law in the
1930s organized the federal courts' engagement with private disputes in a
changing litigation environment in those eras, I contend that the recent
developments present an analogous approach today.
III. A COMMON LAW COURT
In an array of recent decisions, the Supreme Court has refrained doctrines
of justiciability and civil procedure. In this Part, I examine these decisions-
across areas of standing, pleading standards, class actions, and bankruptcy
jurisdiction-in order to grasp the Court's vision of the judicial role. I argue
that these decisions reflect a conception of a personal claim as the trigger for
federal court consideration. This common law-based model of the judicial role
is shaping the development of the law of courts, and, in turn, practices of
governing. In approaching contested questions based on a distinct account of
the institutional identity of the federal courts and, pursuant to its vision of that
identity, demanding a personal relationship to a common law or common law-
like claim, I contend that the Court is forging a distinct procedural framework
as a response to the evolving litigation settings of our time.
Though issues of justiciability and civil procedure are of course distinct,
speaking respectively to the domain of the court's authority and the procedures
the court uses in considering claims that are within its domain-and they are
usually treated in separate courses in the law school curriculum-they overlap
in shaping the terms on which a plaintiff can assert a claim. In contexts like
pleading standards and class actions, where the effective ability to bring a claim
may depend on procedural mechanisms, civil procedure rules structure judicial
access just as standing rulings do. I thus treat them together here in discussing
the evolving governance role of the federal courts.
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A. Standing and the Publicization ofPrivate Claims
Cases raising standing issues in the Supreme Court historically tend to
involve a challenge to government action, with a state actor on the far side of
the original "v." 60 This should not be surprising given the early treatment of
standing as a means of protecting progressive legislation and regulation6' and
the development of the doctrine in the 1970s and 80s in response to changes in
constitutional and administrative law.62 In short, standing has traditionally
functioned as a public law doctrine. Recent decisions push against that framing.
In Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization (ACSTO) v. Winn, the
Court addressed a prototypical standing dispute: can taxpayers bring an
Establishment Clause challenge to a state tax credit scheme that subsidizes
scholarships to religious schools? 63 The opinion presents a straightforward
(though contested) 64 standing analysis focused on the alleged harm and the
doctrine of taxpayer standing under Flast v. Cohen.65 Justice Kennedy adds this
at the end of his opinion for the Court:
Few exercises of the judicial power are more likely to undermine public
confidence in the neutrality and integrity of the Judiciary than one which casts
the Court in the role of a Council of Revision, conferring on itself the power to
invalidate laws at the behest of anyone who disagrees with them. In an era of
frequent litigation, class actions, sweeping injunctions with prospective effect,
and continuing jurisdiction to enforce judicial remedies, courts must be more
careful to insist on the formal rules of standing, not less so. Making the Article
III standing inquiry all the more necessary are the significant implications of
constitutional litigation, which can result in rules of wide applicability that are
beyond Congress' power to change. 66
This paragraph is striking in the scope of its concern. Why does Justice
Kennedy bring class actions into this discussion? What do they have to do with
concerns about the Court acting "in the role of a Council of Revision"? Claims
that cast the Court in that type of oversight role will often be appropriate for
class treatment, as they tend to raise common questions and seek injunctive
relief.67 And even assuming that we are in "an era of frequent litigation [and]
601 discuss the exceptions of private enforcement of regulatory provisions and qui tam
claims in Part IV.
61 See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.6 2 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.63 ACSTO v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1440-41 (2011).
64 See id. at 1450 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's approach "has as
little basis in principle as it has in our precedent").65 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
66 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1449.67 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) (providing that a class action may be maintained if "the
party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the
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class actions," why exactly would that mean that "courts must be more careful
to insist on the formal rules of standing"? Is there a connection between these
seemingly different concerns? The Court's invocation of class action practice in
this standing dispute suggests a convergence of these doctrines and indicates an
inclination to merge the concerns of public law into private law contexts.
The Court's 2008 decision in Sprint Communications v. APCC Services
highlights these developments.68 The case stemmed from a statutory scheme
that regulates the terms on which long distance communications carriers and
payphone operators allocate the money spent on "dial-around" calls.69 Because
disputes regularly arise under this framework, and because the costs of bringing
suit in federal court often exceed the amount at stake, "aggregators" like APCC
Services have developed a business in which they are assigned claims by the
rights-holding payphone operators and are paid a fee to prosecute those claims,
and then return to the payphone operator any compensation they recover. 70 The
question before the Sprint Court was whether an aggregator like APCC can
claim an "injury in fact" that can be redressed by the federal court, as standing
doctrine requires. 71 In a decision by Justice Breyer, and over a dissent by Chief
Justice Roberts, the Court concluded that APCC, as an assignee of the payphone
operators' claim, had standing to bring suit.
On Winn's account of the purpose of standing rules, this dispute is
perplexing. If standing is about separation of powers and keeping the courts
within their assigned role72 and away from acting as a Council of Revision, 73
what does the Sprint case have to do with any of that? This is not a case of a
party nosing into things that aren't its business (it literally is APCC's business),
and no party asks the Court to oversee the political branches-indeed, they are
seeking to enforce federal law-so why should standing doctrine bar this claim?
Chief Justice Roberts emphasizes in dissent that the problem is that plaintiff
lacks a "personal stake" in the suit-it has "nothing to gain." 74 But this familiar
standing concern appears here in a somewhat uncommon form, as APCC is not
acting on an ideological basis. Rather, it runs a business litigating these claims
class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate
respecting the class as a whole").
68 Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269 (2008).69 See 47 U.S.C. § 226 (2006); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1300 (2007); Sprint, 554 U.S at 271
(explaining the scheme).
70 See Sprint, 554 U.S. at 271-72 (explaining this system).
71 See id. at 273-74.
72 See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492-93 (2009) (noting that
standing requirements are "founded in concern about the proper-and properly limited-role
of the courts in a democratic society" (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
73 Justice Kennedy, the author of Winn, joined the Court's opinion in Sprint.74 See Sprint, 554 U.S. at 299, 300 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("personal stake"); id. at
298 ("nothing to gain").
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on behalf of the rights-holders, 75 and in doing so allows for the otherwise
unviable enforcement of federal law.
That seems to be the problem. Chief Justice Roberts makes his concerns
clear: "The right to sue is now the exact opposite of a personal claim-it is a
marketable commodity." 76 And, "[1]egal claims, at least those brought in federal
court, are not fungible commodities."77 But legal claims apparently are
commodities, so long as the buyer purchases both the claim and the remedy.78
This suggests that it is the splitting of right and remedy that commoditizes the
claim. On this account, that commoditization depersonalizes the claim and
renders it unsuitable for resolution by the federal courts.
In debating APCC's ability to facilitate the enforcement of the statutory
scheme, the Sprint opinions engage broader questions about what types of
claims can call forth judicial involvement in enforcing statutory schemes. For
the dissenters, the statutory scheme at issue here grants a right and a remedy to
payphone operators: it is their claim. And if the rights-holders aren't going to
enforce that claim themselves or give the whole thing to someone else to do so,
the Court should not take part in enforcing it either. What is at stake for
standing in Sprint, then, does concern separation of powers, but from a different
angle than in Winn. The case asks when the federal courts can participate in
promoting the enforcement of substantive law rather than when they can
monitor and oversee the other branches. And, for four Justices, just as in the
more familiar latter setting, the Court should not extend its role beyond the
resolution of personal claims to engaging the work of the political branches in
this way. As a result, in facilitating or refusing to accommodate private
enforcement of federal law through standing and procedural doctrines, the Court
shapes the practices of twenty-first-century governance. 79
75 APCC Services is a subsidiary of the American Public Communications Council,
Inc., the national trade association for payphone service providers. AM. PUB. COMM.
COUNCIL, INC., http://www.apcc.net (last visited Jan. 14, 2013).
76 Sprint, 554 U.S. at 302 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
77Id
781d. at 306 ("Much of the majority's historical analysis focuses on the generic (and
undisputed) point that common law and equity courts eventually permitted assignees to sue
on their assigned claims. I would treat that point as settled as much by stare decisis, as by
the historic practice of the King's Bench and Chancery." (citations omitted)).
79 The Court last Term dismissed as improvidently granted a case that directly raised
these standing issues, addressing whether a legislative grant of a statutory right (there
involving the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974) is sufficient to support
standing when plaintiff did not allege an economic or other tangible harm from the violation
of the statutory provision. See First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 132 S. Ct. 2536, 2537
(2012). As emerged in oral argument, a fundamental question in the case surrounded the
capacity of private plaintiffs to enforce the statutory scheme. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral
Argument at 29, First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 132 S. Ct. 2536 (2012) (No. 10-708)
(Scalia, J., questioning counsel for respondent) ("[T]here can be suits by-by the Federal
Government or, I think, under this statute even by State-State attorneys general. The issue
isn't whether Congress can achieve that result. It's whether they can achieve it by permitting
private suits.").
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Though the party seeking judicial involvement wins in Sprint, the divide
revealed by the opinions calls attention to the role of standing doctrine in the
sphere of claims against private actors and to the importance accorded the
presence of a personal claim by a number of the Justices. This framing is
familiar in the standing case law: what is striking is the work it is doing in a
private actor context like that in Sprint. The issues at stake in this setting are
mirrored by those raised in two recent areas of controversy: pleading standards
and class action rules.
B. Pleading Standards and Personal Knowledge
The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twomblo
and Ashcroft v. Iqbals' have received an enormous amount of attention. These
decisions reworked the law of pleading standards, 82 abandoning the old
generous approach to Rule 8 stemming from the 1957 decision in Conley v.
Gibson,83 and adopting a new "plausibility" standard whose precise contours
remain in some dispute. 84 The Court's treatment of these issues aligns with the
standing cases in effectively requiring some personal relationship to the
underlying claims by demanding the plaintiff initially plead non-conclusory
facts that in the court's view support a claim for relief.
In raising the requirements for access to the federal courts,85 the heightened
pleading standards function much like standing requirements. Just as plaintiffs
must assert an '"injury in fact' that is concrete and particularized," 86 so too
must plaintiffs now plead non-conclusory facts that can state a claim in order to
access the federal courts. Standing requirements and pleading standards thus
combine to limit the types of claims that federal courts will consider.
While the Twombly decision announced the new pleading era, Iqbal not
only took the Twombly framing a step further,87 but read the new standard back
80 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
81 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
82 Pleading standards are "the set of threshold requirements a plaintiff's case-initiating
written filing must satisfy to obtain access to discovery and the other case development tools
and procedures characteristic of U.S. litigation." Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading
Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REv. 90, 109 (2009).
83355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).
84 See, e.g., David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 GEO. L.J. 117, 121 (2010)
(arguing that "Iqbal did not, and inevitably could not, answer a number of questions about
how a court should adjudicate a motion to dismiss").
85 See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access,
94 IOWA L. REv. 873, 876 (2009) (viewing Twombly "not so much as a pleading decision but
rather as a court access decision, one that addresses a general problem of institutional
design: how best to prevent undesirable lawsuits from entering the court system").
86 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009).
87 See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 849, 851 (2010) (arguing that "a fair reading of
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into Twombly.88 The Iqbal decision articulates that standard as requiring
plaintiffs to plead "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." 89 In
developing this standard, the Court identifies two principles: "the tenet that a
court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions"; and that the complaint must state "a
plausible claim for relief' as judged by the reviewing court's "judicial
experience and common sense." 90 Taken together, these principles reveal the
Iqbal Court effectively telling would-be plaintiffs: "You just tell us the facts
and we'll let you know if they state a claim."
Iqbal's divide between facts and legal conclusions recalls not only the
traditional judge-jury divide, but also the nineteenth-century Field Code model
of procedure, which likewise emphasized fact pleading.91 In departing from the
older common law pleading model, 92 the Field Code was intended to facilitate
the enforcement of common law rights.93 By framing the initial pleading
requirements as fact-based, and giving federal judges the authority to dismiss
claims based on an initial assessment of whether the pleaded facts really state a
claim-potentially before any discovery94-the Iqbal Court sharply limits the
ability of plaintiffs to advance claims based on facts outside of their personal
knowledge.
In doing so, the Court complicates private enforcement of federal law,
especially where the plaintiff is not directly involved in the underlying events,
requiring as a practical matter a personal connection to the claim.95 The
the majority opinion shows that Iqbal's version of plausibility is significantly stricter than
Twombly's").88 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-80 (2009).
89 1d. at 678.
90 1d. at 678-79.
91 See Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical
Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REv. 311, 328-31 (1988) (noting
that "' [F]acts constituting a cause of action' was the pleading requirement" used in the Field
Code, id at 328, and discussing that standard (alteration in original) (quoting 1848 Field
Code at § 120(2))).
92 See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 52, at 914-18 (outlining traditional common law
procedure).
93 See Subrin, supra note 91, at 327 ("The major goal of the Code was to expedite the
predictable enforcement of discretely articulated rights."); see also Robert G. Bone,
Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the
Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 97 (1989) ("Late nineteenth century
jurists believed in a fundamental dichotomy between right and remedy and in the right-
remedy-procedure hierarchy that held that procedure was instrumental to granting the ideal
remedy, which, in turn, was instrumental to protecting legal rights rooted in natural law
beliefs.").
94 See Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REv. 53, 53 (2010).
95 See Robin J. Effron, The Plaintiff Neutrality Principle: Pleading Complex Litigation
in the Era of Twombly and Iqbal, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1997, 1998 (2010) (observing
that in complex litigation settings, plaintiffs make allegations about themselves, about other
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plaintiffs in Twombly lacked such a personal connection to the claim, (aside
from being "subscribers of local telephone and/or high speed internet services"
in the relevant period), and seven members of the Court were disinclined to let
them enforce the antitrust laws without something beyond "circumstantial
evidence" of parallel conduct and allegations of conspiracy.96 While Iqbal
obviously did have a personal stake in his claim that he was "deprived of
various constitutional protections while in federal custody," 97 Justice Kennedy's
opinion treats him almost as though he had no feud with Attorney General
Ashcroft and FBI Director Mueller themselves, (as opposed to the other
defendants), 98 and that Iqbal was basically just guessing as to the nature or
extent of their involvement. The result in both cases turns in large part on the
sense that plaintiffs lacked the type of personal involvement in the events
generating the dispute that would give them access to non-conclusory facts. The
decisions thus reshape pleading requirements by effectively demanding
personal knowledge of the case.
It is fitting that Conley and Twombly form the two poles of the notice
pleading era. The Conley standard emerged in the context of a claim for private
enforcement of a regulatory scheme, an effort to secure compliance with the
Railway Labor Act. 99 Notice pleading aligns well with private enforcement
mechanisms, as plaintiffs enforcing federal statutory law would not necessarily
have access to all the relevant facts as easily as they would in bringing
traditional common law claims. Charles Clark, a leading force behind the
Federal Rules, anticipated that procedure would function in much this way, as a
means of promoting the enforcement of federal law. 100
Twombly is the natural endpoint of this approach. Aside from having lost a
small amount of money, Twombly has no real personal claim, but is instead
seeking, along with the class he represents, to enforce the antitrust laws. This is
the point at which the Court indicates the departure from the personal common
law claim has gone far enough and draws the line. Iqbal is not a private
enforcement claim but, as a Bivens claim,101 asks the court to oversee official
members of the class, and about defendants, and arguing that allegations plaintiffs make
about themselves may deserve a stronger presumption of truth).
96 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553-54, 564-69 (2007).
97 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 666.
98 See id. at 681-82.
99 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 42 (1957).
l0oSee Subrin, supra note 52, at 966 (noting that "Clark perceived litigation as designed
for something more than the purpose of merely resolving a dispute between two parties").
101 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 388 (1971) (allowing tort action against government official for violation of
constitutional rights). It is worth noting that the Bivens doctrine has become something of a
constitutional dead end (and the Bivens action has been codified into statutory law), raising
further difficulties for Iqbal's claim. See, e.g., Alexander A. Reinert & Lumen N. Mulligan,
Asking the First Question: Refraining Bivens After Minneci, 90 WASH. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 4), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-2042175.
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action and enforce the Constitution against government officials. 102 Here, in a
claim that stems from a common law model but now takes a form particular to
the administrative state, the Court confirms the new Twombly approach and its
expectation of a personal connection. This new pleading standard looks back to
the pleading standards of an earlier era, demanding that plaintiffs plead facts
that the Court can determine to state a claim, thereby privileging the types of
common law claims that underlie that former pleading requirement.
The pleading standards decisions are thus a companion piece to the standing
debate in Sprint. In both settings, the Court struggles over a model of procedural
law calibrated to a world of common law claims in contrast to an approach that
facilitates the vindication of statutory programs. Recent class action rulings
present this tension as well.
C. Class Actions and the Nature of Courts
The rules governing class actions have been a source of drama in recent
years. Like the standing and pleading standards decisions discussed above, the
treatment of class actions reveals a court orienting its procedural law around the
resolution of common law claims. I examine these cases here, first discussing
the Court's emphasis on the idea that there is a fundamental nature of the
federal courts that guides the analysis in these procedural disputes, and then
observing the Court's privileging of the personal claim. The class action setting
reveals the tensions between this approach and one that emphasizes the
enforcement of substantive law.
1. Fundamental Attributes of the Adjudicative Forum
Two recent decisions address the availability of aggregation procedures in
arbitration proceedings under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 103 These
decisions illuminate the divide on the Court surrounding the fit of class actions
with a particular vision of the judicial role. In a 5-3 decision in Stolt-Nielsen
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. the Court concluded that "a party may
not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a
contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so."1 04 The Court
explained that "class-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such
a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply
agreeing to submit their disputes to an arbitrator."' 0 5 This idea of "the nature of
arbitration" appears to be doing much of the work in this decision.
102 See David Zaring, Personal Liability as Administrative Law, 66 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 313, 314 (2009) (discussing the personal liability suit as "an increasingly popular
alternative to litigation under traditional administrative law").
103 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
104 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010)
(emphasis removed).
105 d.
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The Court reiterated this framing on an almost identical divide in AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion,106 ruling that the FAA preempts California contract law
providing that class action waivers are unconscionable and unenforceable in
certain circumstances. 107 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia emphasized that
class arbitration differs dramatically from individual arbitration, and stated that
class treatment "interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus
creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA." 08 In dissent, Justice Breyer
argued that the law at issue is simply state contract law applicable to any
contract, and the characteristics of class arbitration are therefore irrelevant. 0 9
This divide follows from the Court's recurring approach in these cases. The
Court indicates that class treatment is so inconsistent with the idea of arbitration
that it is appropriate only if the parties agree to it. In emphasizing the
"fundamental attributes of arbitration" Io-like Stolt-Nielsen's invocation of the
"nature of arbitration"' I-the Concepcion opinion treats the FAA just as the
Court's standing jurisprudence treats Article III of the Constitution: the Court
identifies the inherent nature of the adjudicating institution, there based on a
traditional account of "cases" and "controversies," 1 2 and limits the forum to
disputes fitting that ideal.
After detailing the ways that class treatment differs from individual
litigation,"13 the Concepcion Court discounts one of the primary interests that
underlie class action law and perhaps the primary driver of the 1966
amendments to Rule 23: the goal of making negative-value claims viable.1 4 In
106 See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1740 (2011). Justice Sotomayor
had recused herself in Stolt-Nielsen, but joined the dissent in Concepcion, and Justice Kagan
replaced Justice Stevens in dissent. Justice Thomas concurred separately, but "reluctantly
join[ed]" the Court's opinion. Id. at 1754 (Thomas, J., concurring).
1071d. at 1746-47 (discussing Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (2005)).
108 1d. at 1748.
1091d. at 1760 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Because California applies the same legal
principles to address the unconscionability of class arbitration waivers as it does to address
the unconscionability of any other. contractual provision, the merits of class proceedings
should not factor into our decision.").
110 1d. at 1748.
Ill Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1774.
ll 2 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) ("Article III,
§ 2, of the Constitution extends the 'judicial Power' of the United States only to 'Cases' and
'Controversies.' We have always taken this to mean cases and controversies of the sort
traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.").
113 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750-52.
ll4See Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the
Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 684, 684 (1941) ("The type of injury which tends to affect
simultaneously the interest of many people is also apt to involve immensely complex facts
and intricate law, and redress for it is likely to involve expense totally disproportionate to
any of the individual claims."); see also infra text accompanying note 173. But see Brown v.
Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1952 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (advancing "the bedrock rule that
the sole purpose of classwide adjudication is to aggregate claims that are individually
viable").
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basing its ruling on the character of the forum, and minimizing the interest in
vindication of the underlying rights,' 15 a majority of the Court privileges a
particular vision of the adjudicative role, one centered on an idealized model of
individual litigation, over a vision focused on achievement of substantive ends.
This focus on an essential institutional nature as the basis of decision-and that
nature being individual litigation-shapes the treatment of all of these cases.
The fractured decision in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate
Insurance Co. poses a similar question about the nature of the forum, there in
the setting of the Erie doctrine.1 16 Beneath the doctrinal complexities, the basic
question of Shady Grove is whether the mechanism for aggregating claims is
tied to the adjudicative setting or if it instead travels with the substantive right.
This is of course the Erie inquiry, but this framing illuminates the larger issue
here: what does identifying the class action as connected variously to the right
or to the institution say about the judicial role? In its treatment of this issue, the
Shady Grove opinion aligns with the other recent cases in privileging a common
law dispute resolution role over that of facilitating the enforcement of
substantive law.
Quick background: New York statutory law provides that payment of
insurance benefits be made within thirty days, and specifies that overdue
payments incur a two percent per month interest rate.117 Shady Grove
Orthopedic Associates had a claim against Allstate Insurance for failure to pay
roughly $500 in statutory interest, and sought to bring the claim as a class action
based on the allegation that "Allstate routinely refuses to pay interest on
overdue benefits."' 18 The complication was that the New York class action law
indicates that, unless specifically provided, "an action to recover a penalty, or
minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by statute may not be
maintained as a class action." 1 9 Because the claim therefore could not proceed
as a class action in the New York courts, Shady Grove brought a diversity
action in federal court, raising the question whether the proposed class could be
certified under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or whether the New York
class action bar applied in federal court as well.120
Applying the familiar Erie substance/procedure analysis, the case produced
a 4-1-4 split: a plurality joining an opinion by Justice Scalia combined with
Justice Stevens to conclude that the claim could proceed as a class action in
federal court, while Justice Ginsburg argued in dissent that New York law as to
the remedy should apply. The three opinions reveal relevantly different
orientations to the interplay of class certification and (state) substantive law,
115 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 ("States cannot require a procedure that is
inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.").
116 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
l7 N.Y. INs. LAw § 5106(a) (McKinney 2006).
118 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436-37.
119Id. at 1436 n.1 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006)).
120Id. at 1436.
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and I address them here in some detail, though with as little immersion in the
weeds of Erie as possible.121
Justice Scalia's reasoning is straightforward: for purposes of the Erie
analysis, a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is procedural if on its face it
regulates procedure, whatever its effects on substance.122 This approach echoes
his treatment of the Free Exercise Clause in Employment Division v. Smith,12 3
and the right to vote in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board 24 : real-
world effects are not the point-the restriction is on a certain kind of rule. As a
form of joinder, the class action is a procedural mechanism,125 and that is all the
Rules Enabling Act demands. 126 As such, the Federal Rule applies.
Justice Stevens reverses this inquiry, focusing on the state law at issue and
whether it addresses "substantive rights and remedies." 27 On this account, if a
federal procedural rule conflicts with state substantive rights and remedies that
rule would not apply. Justice Stevens sets a high bar for this conclusion,128
emphasizing that what the federal rule conflicts with must actually be a
substantive right or remedy, and not just a state policy.1 29 Q will return in a
moment to this enigmatic distinction.) Because it was not sufficiently clear
whether the New York law reflected a substantive right or remedy or merely a
policy judgment, he concludes that the class action could proceed in federal
court under Rule 23.130 In framing the analysis to center on the state law rather
than the federal rule, Justice Stevens departs from the facial assessment of the
federal rule that Justice Scalia advances.
In contrast to both of these approaches, Justice Ginsburg addresses the
interplay of the federal rule and the state law rather than either alone, and argues
that the federal rules should be applied wherever possible to avoid conflict with
state policy.131 On her account, there need not be a conflict if we treat the
federal class action as a purely procedural mechanism that only addresses claim
aggregation and leaves state law to specify the remedy, thus allowing federal
121 For discussion of the intricacies of Erie in this setting, see Adam N. Steinman, Our
Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1131 (2011).
122 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442.
123 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
124553 U.S. 181, 204-09 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
125 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443.
12628 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (providing that the rules of procedure "shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right").
127 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).12 8Id. at 1457 ("In my view, however, the bar for finding an Enabling Act problem is a
high one.").
I29 See id
130I. at 1459-60.
131 Id. at 1467-68 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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procedure and state substantive law to coexist.132 This approach smuggles the
state policy into the application of Rule 23, shaping a framework in which the
federal rule would function differently in varying substantive settings, in
contrast to Justice Scalia's "one-size-fits-all" model.133
Though Justice Ginsburg indicates that plaintiffs raising claims under New
York law can bring class actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief or
actual damages,1 34 there will often be no reason to go to the trouble of trying to
certify a class without the possibility of aggregating the statutory remedy. We
can therefore read her opinion as a subtle means of barring this class action
without explicitly saying so. Accordingly, while Justice Ginsburg presents a
procedural account of class actions as a means of aggregating claims without
inherent remedial implications, her treatment of the state class action law as a
significant practical constraint reveals a more substantive account of the class
mechanism.
The Justices' division over the application of Erie highlights the central
divide in the case: to what extent should federal courts treat class action law as a
matter of substance, rather than procedure? Justice Stevens is willing to do so,
but is not convinced in this case, while Justice Ginsburg applies the New York
law as a substantive limitation on statutory penalties. Both of these approaches
differ from Justice Scalia's emphatically procedural account of class actions.
Indeed, Justice Scalia declines to say "whether a state law that limits the
remedies available in an existing class action would conflict with Rule 23 ,"135
suggesting that rules pertaining to aggregation may be inherently procedural,
however they are framed.
Justice Stevens usefully presents this question in drawing a line between
substantive rights and remedies, on the one hand, and state policy on the other.
This framing stems from the Rules Enabling Act's direction that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right." 36 Justice Stevens articulates the operative distinction as between a
definition of rights or remedies or, in this case, a "'limitation' on New York's
'statutory damages,"' 37 as opposed to "a judgment about how state courts
ought to operate."l 38 While this explanation of the opposed categories is at heart
another way of saying "substance" and "procedure," it presents the divide as
between the content of the right and the institutional means of enforcement. The
distinction thus addresses the extent to which the aggregation mechanism
travels with the right or is instead a characteristic of the institutional setting.
132 Id. at 1466 ("Rule 23 describes a method of enforcing a claim for relief, while [the
New York law] defines the dimensions of the claim itself.").
133 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 (plurality opinion).
134I. at 1467 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
135 Id. at 1439 & n.4 (plurality opinion).
136 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
137 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
1381d.
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Justice Stevens reads New York law to limit the role of courts in allocating
statutory damages, requiring such litigation to proceed on a retail rather than
wholesale basis.139 On this view, once the case moves from state to federal
court, the characteristics of the federal judicial setting govern, allowing
aggregation under Rule 23. His divide from Justice Ginsburg can be understood
as her seeing the New York class action policy to implicate the content of the
right: limiting statutory damages to their statutorily defined amount in any
single litigation. In contrast to both, and consistent with his opinion in
Concepcion, Justice Scalia treats the availability of class treatment to inherently
follow from the institutional setting, and thus provided for here by Rule 23.
Like its predecessor Gasperini v. Center for Humanities,140 Shady Grove
reveals a consistent divide on the Court on whether provisions that take form as
procedure but have significant substantive implications should be treated as tied
to the right itself or to the adjudicating institution. Viewing Concepcion and
Shady Grove together, the divide is whether aggregation mechanisms are
features of the institutional setting or are better viewed as entwined with the
underlying substantive right. And the institutional account wins in both cases.
Justice Ginsburg invokes the Class Action Fairness Act141 (CAFA) at the
end of her dissent, pointing out the "large irony" in the Court's decision. 142 Her
point is that Shady Grove's state law claim was in federal court solely by virtue
of CAFA's bestowal of diversity jurisdiction on this type of class action, and
the basic purpose of CAFA was to limit the availability of class actions rather
than to allow for federal consideration of claims that would not be viable in
state court.143 But there is no irony here: just as the New York class action
provision is understood by the plurality and Justice Stevens as institutionally
based and thus untethered to the underlying right, CAFA likewise is treated as
shaping institutional practice distinct from the interest in any substantive result.
In drawing a line between institutional practice and substantive rights, the
Shady Grove result is in tension with the intents of political actors in a number
of ways-the New York law barring class action treatment of these claims, the
Rules Enabling Act, which prohibits the modification of substantive rights by
the Federal Rules, and CAFA, which was intended to limit the availability of
class actions-each of which arguably connects the procedural provision to the
substantive right. This judicial assertion of authority follows from a conception
of the aggregation mechanism as a component of an institutional role and
139Id. at 1459.
140518 U.S. 415 (1996). Gasperini presented a fairly analogous Erie claim, and
produced almost the identical division, but with a flipped result because Justice Souter
joined Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Gasperini, and his successor Justice Sotomayor joined
(most of) Justice Scalia's opinion in Shady Grove.
14128 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006).
142 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1473 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
143Id. ("By providing a federal forum, Congress sought to check what it considered to
be the overreadiness of some state courts to certify class actions. ... In other words,
Congress envisioned fewer-not more-class actions overall." (citations omitted)).
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unconnected to an accommodation of any substantive interest. In these cases,
the Court indicates that achieving the goals of substantive law is not the Court's
concern.
2. The Individual and the Class
The indication that federal courts will decide these procedural issues with
reference to the institutional characteristics of the adjudicative forum prompts
questions about how class actions fit with those characteristics. Perhaps the
most fundamental problem in this setting is the relationship of the individual to
the class, an issue that emerges in recent cases in a variety of forms. Consistent
with the recent emphasis on the personal relationship to the claim in standing
and pleading standards doctrine, we see here as well the Court organizing its
approach around the individual harm.
This question recently arose when a federal district court sought to enjoin a
putative products liability class action claim in state court in a situation where
the federal court had already denied class certification on a largely identical
claim brought by a separate plaintiff, and the state court plaintiff was not
connected to the federal court proceeding. 144 At heart, the question before the
Court in Smith v. Bayer Corp. was this: when a plaintiff seeks to certify a class
and is denied, is that a judgment against the proposed class or only against that
particular plaintiff?l 45 From an efficiency perspective it may be counter-
productive to allow new plaintiffs to continue trying to certify the identical
class; at the same time, Smith, the state court plaintiff, had not yet received his
"day in court," even if the proposed class in some sense had.
The Court had considered an analogous issue a few years before in Taylor
v. Sturgell, where, after an airplane buff lost on a Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) claim to declassify the plans for an F-45 airplane, a friend of the first
plaintiff filed his own FOIA claim seeking the same plans.146 The Taylor Court
unanimously rejected the D.C. Circuit's "virtual representation" approach that
had precluded the second claim, concluding that the virtual representation
approach would create "a common-law kind of class action" without any of
Rule 23's "procedural protections." 47 The point is that the second plaintiff is
entitled to his day in court, just as anyone else is.14 8 Unlike Taylor, the Smith
144 Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011).
145 As a doctrinal matter, the questions were whether the class certification issue before
the state court was the same as that before the federal court and whether the state court
plaintiff was, as "an unnamed member of a proposed but uncertified class," a party to the
federal court litigation or otherwise precludable under class action exceptions. Id. at 2379.
146 Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 885-87 (2008).
147 Id. at 901.
148 For discussion of the problems raised by this case, see Samuel Issacharoff, Private
Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REv. 183, 198-203, and Judith Resnik, Compared
to What?: ALI Aggregation and the Shifting Contours of Due Process and of Lawyers'
Powers, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 628, 685-90 (2011).
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plaintiffs did not know one another and were not represented by the same
attorney, so the only basis for a different result would be if the failed attempt to
certify the class swept all members of that class into the web of preclusion.
Sure enough, the Smith Court unanimously rejected the preclusion claim,149
denying any party preclusion based on being a member of a failed class.' 50 In
response to the efficiency concerns, the Court indicated that "our legal system
generally relies on principles of stare decisis and comity among courts to
mitigate the sometimes substantial costs of similar litigation brought by
different plaintiffs." 5 1 Thus, to whatever extent efficiency is a concern, the
proper response is not to deny individuals the right to bring a claim but instead
to figure out some other way to deal with the problem.
Smith presents the Court's recognition of the challenges presented by a
litigation model premised on the individual day in court and the commitment to
that model despite its costs. In both Taylor and Smith, the claim plaintiff sought
to raise in the second case had been considered and decided by the first court,
and a second (or third, or fourth) go-around was plausibly a waste of time. 152
But Smith holds that those systemic inefficiency issues must be handled, if at
all, at the level of how the court approaches the claim, not by interfering with a
plaintiffs basic ability to bring suit based on his or her personal harm. The
common law (or common law-like) personal harm dictates the Court's
approach, here demanding as opposed to barring judicial access. In keying
preclusion to the individual rather than the class, Smith asserts the primacy of
the individual claim.
This dynamic takes different form in the Wal-Mart decision, again
presenting an opinion for the Court by Justice Scalia and a dissent by Justice
Ginsburg.153 This dispute famously addressed an effort to certify a class of all
female Wal-Mart employees since 1998 based on allegations of discrimination
on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII.154 While the Court was unanimous
in denying certification of the proposed class under Rule 23(b)(2), the Justices
split 5-4 on the question of commonality under Rules 23(a)(2) and whether
plaintiffs could potentially seek certification of the class under Rule
149 Justice Thomas did not join the party preclusion part of the Smith opinion, though
without explanation. Smith, 131 S. Ct. at 2373.
1501d. at 2379-80. The Court also indicated that the state court's consideration of the
state Rule 23 presented a different legal question than a federal court ruling on certification
under Federal Rule 23, especially where the state supreme court had earlier indicated that
federal court decisions on Rule 23 were "not binding or controlling" on it. Id. at 2378
(quoting In re W. Va. Rezulin Lit., 585 S.E.2d 52, 61 (2003)).
15 11d. at 2381.
152 I leave aside the "different court/different question" issue raised in Smith. See supra
note 150.
153 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
154I. at 2549.
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23(b)(3)155-ultimately, whether the plaintiffs' allegations could support class
treatment on any theory.
The Wal-Mart opinions are not entirely clear about the extent to which the
divide is about class action doctrine or about substantive antidiscrimination law.
In an article cited by both the majority and the dissent, Richard Nagareda argues
that disputes about aggregate proof in class certification are often disputes about
the underlying law.156 And the divide in Wal-Mart indeed reveals a
disagreement about the nature of the claimed discrimination: whether the claim
is that the discretion given by Wal-Mart headquarters allows for individual acts
of discrimination, which would then need to be proven, 157 or whether the
discretion-granting system itself results in discrimination, as demonstrated by
statistical data.158 Are we dealing with a bunch of individual acts of
discrimination or a framework of aggregate discrimination?
While the divide may stem as much from diverging accounts of Title VII as
of Rule 23, the competing visions of the underlying right shape the treatment of
the class certification claim. The Wal-Mart Court indicates that not only can the
proposed class not be certified under 23(b)(2), but that it could not be certified
under 23(b)(3) either, and plaintiffs shouldn't bother coming back to try again.
In going beyond what was necessary to decide the case (unanimously!) under
(b)(2) alone, Justice Scalia arguably sought to enshrine guidelines for class
certification more generally.159 The majority's framing presents the question of
commonality as the decisive issue, and ultimately treats the commonality
inquiry in a distinctive way, what Justice Ginsburg refers to as its
"dissimilarities position." 60 On this approach, plaintiffs must identify a
"common contention" that is "of such a nature that it is capable of classwide
resolution,"'61 and that is not subject to the type of dissimilarities that would get
in the way of common answers. 162 The demand is thus for a class in which "all
their claims can productively be litigated at once."l 63 In contrast, Justice
155Id at 2561-62 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).156 Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof 84 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 97, 104 (2009) ("Aggregate proof frequently offers not so much a contested account
of the facts that bear on class certification but, more fundamentally, an implicit demand for a
new and often controversial conception of the substantive law that governs the litigation.").
157 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554-55.
1581d. at 2564 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting the district
court's articulation of the common question as "whether Wal-Mart's pay and promotions
policies gave rise to unlawful discrimination").
159 Indeed, the Court itself added the commonality issue to the questions presented. See
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010) (granting certiorari and adding to the
question presented an additional question: "Whether the class certification ordered under
Rule 23(b)(2) was consistent with Rule 23(a)").
160 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
161Id. at 2551 (majority opinion).
16 2 See id at 2551, 2556-57 (quoting Nagareda, supra note 156, at 132).
163Id. at 2551.
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Ginsburg would focus the commonality inquiry on whether there is a dispute
"the resolution of which will advance the determination of the class members'
claims."' 64 And so, while Justice Scalia indicates that the reasons for the
allegedly discriminatory employment decisions must be common,165 Justice
Ginsburg identifies the question common to the class as whether the
discretionary policies-rather than the individual employment decisions-were
discriminatory.166
These competing approaches tie the Wal-Mart decision to the broader
argument here. Much of what makes the plaintiffs' claim complex is its framing
as a pattern or practice claim under Title VII, a claim that is by definition an
aggregate claim, requiring evidence extending beyond any individual
plaintiff.167 Aggregate claims of this type are predictably intractable on a basic
personal harm account. In tension with the plaintiffs' framing of the claim,
Justice Scalia's opinion effectively articulates commonality as a function of
identical individual claims rather than of a uniform aggregate claim. In other
words, consistent with his insistence in Shady Grove on class actions as a
joinder device-and motivated by an emphasis on judicial efficiency rather than
enforcement of substantive law168-Justice Scalia's Wal-Mart opinion depicts
the putative (b)(3) class to follow from a mass of shared individual claims and
thus to demand similarity at a high level.169 This approach is in contrast to
Justice Ginsburg's framing, which starts the commonality inquiry from the
164 Id. at 2562 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165 Id. at 2552 (majority opinion).
166 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2565 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).167 See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360-61 n.46 (1977)
("[A]t the liability stage of a pattern-or-practice trial the focus often will not be on individual
hiring decisions, but on a pattern of discriminatory decisionmaking. While a pattern might
be demonstrated by examining the discrete decisions of which it is composed, the
Government's suits have more commonly involved proof of the expected result of a
regularly followed discriminatory policy."). Some courts have indicated that private
plaintiffs filing pattern or practice suits should bring them as class actions rather than as
individual suits. See Celestine v. Petroleos de Venez. SA, 266 F.3d 343, 355-56 (5th Cir.
2001) (making this point and citing cases from other courts).
168 This is a historically contested view. See Diane Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions:
Joinder or Representational Device?, 1983 SUP. CT. REv. 459, 472 (discussing Professor
Moore's dispute with Kalven and Rosenfield about the nature of the class action and quoting
his explanation: "'The basic controversy remains whether the proper goal for the class action
should be limited to the minimum one of providing a shortcut to otherwise multitudinous
litigation, or on the other hand, should be extended to the maximum one of opening court
access to otherwise nonlitigable claims."' (quoting 3B JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE T 23.03[1] (2d ed. 1982)).
169 See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552 ("Here respondents wish to sue about literally
millions of employment decisions at once. Without some glue holding the alleged reasons
for all those decisions together, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class
members' claims for relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I
disfavored.").
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challenged policy itself, allowing for more variation among the individuals
subject to that policy as a means of facilitating enforcement of Title VII.
Justice Scalia's treatment of the commonality inquiry suggests a renewal of
an old approach to class actions. As one commentator has noted, "[i]t is
impossible to avoid the conclusion that the Court was hostile to common
question class actions" in the pre-Federal Rules era.170 Later, the original
version of Rule 23 provided for so-called "spurious" class actions, involving
rights which were "several, and there is' a common question of law or fact
affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought."' 7 ' This version of
the Rule, described by its original drafter as a "permissive joinder device,"1 72
was amended in 1966, based in significant part on the interest in promoting the
vindication of substantive rights.173 The Court's invocation in Wal-Mart of the
judicial efficiency justification for class actions at the expense of the facilitation
of private enforcement thus echoes an earlier procedural model centered on the
resolution of individual claims. In short, consistent with Concepcion and Shady
Grove's framing of the class action as a question of institutional authority, Wal-
Mart articulates a model of procedure premised on a vision of the federal courts
as responding to individual claims.
The unanimous decision addressing class certification of securities fraud
claims in Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton challenges this account. 174 To
simplify, securities fraud claims present a five-part story: (1) Defendant
misrepresents, (2) causing the price of the stock to rise (or to not fall), (3) at
which point plaintiff purchases the stock, (4) following which the truth emerges,
(5) causing the price to drop and plaintiff to suffer a loss. In order to state such a
claim under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
1Ob-5, plaintiffs must demonstrate reliance, among other elements, as a means
of connecting steps (1) and (2) to step (3).175 The hurdle emerged that reliance,
an element of the common law fraud cause of action, is largely incompatible
with class action treatment, because each class member would need to
individually demonstrate that he or she had relied on the fraudulent statement
and had acted in reliance on the misrepresentation, meaning that individual
questions would predominate and the class could not be certified under Rule
23(b)(3).1 76 In 1988, however, the Court adopted the "fraud-on-the-market"
170 Wood Hutchinson, supra note 168, at 467.
171 Id. at 469 n.37 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) (1938)).
172Id. at 470 (quoting MOORE, supra note 168, Tj 23.10[1]).
173 See Resnik, supra note 148, at 650 ("The core ideas of the 1966 version of Rule 23
are access and equality.").
174 Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).
175 See id. at 2184 (listing "elements of a private securities fraud claim based on
violations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5").
176 Id. at 2185 (noting that "'[r]equiring proof of individualized reliance from each
member of the proposed plaintiff class effectively would' prevent such plaintiffs 'from
proceeding with a class action, since individual issues' would 'over-whelm[] the common
ones"' (alterations in original) (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988))).
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presumption, according to which "the market price of shares traded on well-
developed markets reflects all publicly available information, and, hence, any
material misrepresentations." 77 This presumption allowed securities fraud
classes to be certified without the need for individual demonstrations of
reliance,178 thus providing an aggregate means of connecting step (3) with steps
(1) and (2).
In Halliburton, the Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's demand that plaintiffs
show loss causation-that the alleged misrepresentation caused their lOSS 179 -in
order to obtain class certification.180 The upshot of this holding is that anything
after step (3) is a separate question from anything beforehand,' 8 ' a question
common to the class of purchasers at step (3) and allowing for class treatment.
What is not clear is why the Court approached the issue this way. The
incompatibility of the Fifth Circuit's approach with the Supreme Court's
treatment of the fraud-on-the-market presumption was apparent, and from an
error correction perspective the decision is unsurprising, but it is worth
considering why the Court reaffirmed, and arguably strengthened, the
presumption at all. The fraud-on-the-market theory has been criticized by
numerous commentators, for a variety of reasons,182 and the Court-or even
one Justice-could easily have taken Halliburton as an opportunity to limit or
clarify the doctrine. Why would the same Court that reached the other decisions
discussed here unanimously facilitate class actions?
Commentators have indicated that the fraud-on-the-market model reflects a
fraud-on-the-market itself, as the name implies, rather than on individual
plaintiffs.183 On this account, individual reliance is largely irrelevant, and
persists in the elements of securities fraud doctrine as a vestigial reminder of the
177 Basic, 485 U.S. at 246.178 See Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the
Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 907, 908 (1989) ("The fraud on the market theory
avoids these problems by interpreting the reliance requirement to mean reliance on the
integrity of the market price rather than reliance on the challenged disclosure.").
179 See Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 597 F.3d
330, 336 (5th Cir. 2010) (following Oscar Private Equity Inv. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc.,
487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007)). None of the other courts of appeals to consider this issue
followed the Fifth Circuit approach. See Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. at 2184 (listing cases).
180 1Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. at 2186 (noting that "[f]oss causation addresses a matter
different from whether an investor relied on a misrepresentation, presumptively or
otherwise, when buying or selling a stock").
181 See Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009
Wis. L. REv. 151, 180 (describing this relationship and noting that loss causation "is
conceptually distinct").
182 See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of
Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 72 (2011) ("The fraud-on-the-market (FOTM)
cause of action just doesn't work."); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation
Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule
10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1301, 1303 (2008) (describing failure of compensatory rationale
for private enforcement of Rule lOb-5 and questioning deterrence justification).
18 3 See Langevoort, supra note 181, at 163-65.
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doctrine's origins in the common law of misrepresentation. 18 4 To the extent the
fraud is viewed as on the market (rather than on any individual), the question is
common and class treatment is appropriate. As a result, Halliburton presents the
opposite claim as that the Court understood the Wal-Mart plaintiffs to be
raising, involving not a mass of individual actions, but a single unitary claim
that yields a common answer. 185 If the fraud is on the market, all that is
particular to the individual class members is the nature of their individual harms
stemming from the timing and extent of their participation in the defrauded
market, much as if Wal-Mart had enacted an explicitly discriminatory policy
(i.e., "only men can be managers"), and the individual harms followed from a
claim that was indisputably on grounds common to the class. And so, just as
with individual discriminatory hiring decisions stemming from a common
policy, the Halliburton plaintiffs suffer individual injuries from a common
market-wide fraud. In both cases, a common act inflicts multiple injuries, which
are then aggregated in the class. But the basis of the claim remains the personal
injury suffered by individual plaintiffs. The fraud is treated as a mass tort, with
the accompanying class treatment. 186
Taken together, the recent class action decisions reveal tensions over the
extent to which a vision of an inherent judicial role shapes the treatment of
184 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 182, at 82 (noting that "[fjraud on the market
under Rule 1 Ob-5 takes the common law tort of misrepresentation from face-to-face dealings
to faceless markets").
185 See Nagareda, supra note 156, at 132 ("What matters to class certification .. . is not
the raising of common 'questions'--even in droves-but, rather, the capacity of a class-wide
proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.").
186 In its most recent consideration of the fraud-on-the-market presumption, the Court
ruled that proof of materiality "is not a prerequisite to class certification," because under
Rule 23(b)(3), "the materiality of Amgen's alleged misrepresentations and omissions is a
question common to all members of the class." Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust
Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2013). Significantly, the basis of disagreement between the
Amgen majority, written by Justice Ginsburg, and the dissents by Justice Scalia and Justice
Thomas, was not whether materiality is a common question, but rather whether all the
elements of the fraud-on-the-market presumption--even elements, such as materiality, that
are common to the class-must be demonstrated for class certification. See id. at 1205
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In my view, however, the Basic rule of fraud-on-the-
market . .. governs not only the question of substantive liability, but also the question
whether certification is proper. All of the elements of that rule, including materiality, must
be established if and when it is relied upon to justify certification."); id. at 1206 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("Without demonstrating materiality at certification, plaintiffs cannot establish
Basic's fraud-on-the-market presumption. Without proof of fraud on the market, plaintiffs
cannot show that otherwise individualized questions of reliance will predominate, as
required by Rule 23(b)(3)."). The divide presents a sort of order of operations problem,
differing over whether a common question that is within the elements of the presumption (as
well as the underlying cause of action) is to be established before or after certification. See
id. at 1193-94 (opinion of the Court); id at 1207 (Thomas, J., dissenting). While the
dissenters' presumption against the presumption aligns with the logic of the common law
personal injury model, the Court's decision is consistent with Halliburton in treating any
fraud in this setting as on the market itself and thus amenable to class treatment.
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procedural questions and the extent to which class action claims are ultimately
individual claims. Along with the standing and pleading standards decisions, the
emphasis on the personal claim as a fundamental model of judicial involvement
underlies these cases, and shapes the Court's structuring of procedural law.
D. Bankruptcy Jurisdiction and the Prototypical Claim
The account presented here is confirmed by another recent decision that
illuminates the competing visions of the role of the federal courts. In Stern v.
Marshall, the Court returned to one of the messiest areas of constitutional
law, 187 considering whether a United States Bankruptcy Court could
constitutionally enter final judgment on a debtor's common law
counterclaim.188 In a series of cases, the Court has vacillated on the
circumstances in which bankruptcy and administrative judges, who do not enjoy
the protections of Article III, including life tenure and salary protections,' 89 can
exercise judicial power.190 In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, and over a
dissent for four Justices by Justice Breyer, the Stern Court ruled that the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over the common law claim was
unconstitutional under Article III.
To reach this conclusion, the Court relied on a longstanding distinction
between "private rights" and "public rights," following an 1856 decision which
indicated that Congress cannot "withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter
which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity,
or admiralty."'91 As Chief Justice Roberts articulated this idea in the Stern
opinion: "[w]hen a suit is made of 'the stuff of the traditional actions at
common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789,' and is brought within
the bounds of federal jurisdiction, the responsibility for deciding that suit rests
with Article III judges in Article III courts."192 Such private rights are
contrasted with public rights-rights "integrally related to particular federal
187See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 93 (1982)
(White, J., dissenting) (referring to characterization of this area as "one of the most
confusing and controversial areas of constitutional law"); see also Caleb Nelson,
Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 563 n.12 (2007)
(collecting sources making similar claims).
188 Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
189 U.S. CONST. art. III; see also Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy,
and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. L. REv. 747 (2010) (discussing this point and arguing
that bankruptcy judges demonstrate values consistent with Article III).
190 See N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 87 (striking down broad grant of jurisdiction to
bankruptcy courts in the Bankruptcy Act of 1978); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (finding no constitutional violation in agency jurisdiction over
common law counter-claims).
191 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284
(1856) (quoted in Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609).
192 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609 (citation omitted) (quoting N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 90
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment)).
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government action"l 93-which may be decided outside the framework of
Article III. This distinction emphasizes the difference between common law-
type rights-rights "of the liability of one individual to another under the law as
defined"' 94-and public rights defined by statute and relating to a "federal
regulatory scheme" or involving claims against the government.' 95 On this
model, a personal harm, meaning a common law harm or a statutory or
constitutional harm that takes the form of a common law harm, necessitates
access to an Article III Court, while public harms defined by positive law but
not taking a private form do not compel access to the federal courts but might
potentially be remedied in other ways, either through administrative or
legislative courts, or by administrative enforcement.
With this distinction, the Stern majority confirms the reading of the recent
cases advanced here, going on to describe "the most prototypical exercise of
judicial power: the entry of a final, binding judgment by a court with broad
substantive jurisdiction, on a common law cause of action, when the action
neither derives from nor depends upon any agency regulatory regime." 96
Dismissing the efficiency benefits Justice Breyer emphasizes in dissent, the
Stern Court refuses to let the common law claim proceed through the
bankruptcy court. Stern reiterates the sense that common law claims, or claims
that look like common law claims, are what the federal courts do, a vision that
shapes procedure and federal courts law in numerous ways.
The divide in Stern reprises the question in all of these cases: Is the
availability of the federal courts to be determined by a basic judicial nature of
responding to personal harms, or can an interest in effectuating the enforcement
of substantive law be taken into account? The competing views on this issue
will shape the availability of the federal courts for participation in the work of
governance going forward, as I turn to in the next Part.
IV. PERSONAL CLAIMS AND REGULATORY SCHEMES
The model the Court has presented in these cases structures the work of the
federal courts. In this Part, I situate this approach in relation to the question of
how the law is enforced. I argue that the Court's approach limits the role of
private enforcement of regulatory programs, thereby privileging public
enforcement and threatening to constrain the capacity of the federal government
to govem effectively in a number of settings.
193Id. at 2613.
194I. at 2612 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50-51 (1932)).
195 Id. at 2613; see also Nelson, supra note 187, at 566-67 (discussing distinction
between private and public rights).
196 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2615 (emphasis omitted).
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A. Private Enforcement and the Court
When a legislature enacts a statute, it must decide how the statutory scheme
will be enforced.197 Among numerous calibrations, the legislature must
determine the balance between public enforcement and private enforcement of
the program. Public enforcement encompasses a broad array of options for
action by government actors, most prominently undertaken by federal
administrative officials, 198 and encompassing action by state officials as well,199
while private enforcement provisions give specified private actors the right to
bring suit for violations of the statute. The distribution of enforcement powers
does much to shape the actual operation of the statutory program.
The Supreme Court has long debated when to imply private rights of action
when statutes do not explicitly provide for private enforcement, 200 and
commentators have canvassed the effects and implications of doing so in
different settings. 201 A number of scholars have recently examined the
considerations that shape the initial allocation of enforcement power by the
legislature. In a comprehensive treatment of this issue, Sean Farhang argues that
"conflict between Congress and the president over control of the bureaucracy, a
perennial feature of the American state, creates incentives for Congress to
bypass the bureaucracy and provide for enforcement via private litigation." 202
David Freeman Engstrom emphasizes, in examining the development of fair
employment law, how the allocation of enforcement power may be influenced
by the desire of various parties for either centralized public enforcement or
more unpredictable private mechanisms. 203 Professor Farhang notes the
197 Justice Frankfurter explains:
How to effectuate policy-the adaptation of means to legitimately sought ends-is one
of the most intractable of legislative problems. Whether proscribed conduct is to be
deterred by qui tam action or triple damages or injunction, or by criminal prosecution,
or merely by defense to actions in contract, or by some, or all, of these remedies in
combination, is a matter within the legislature's range of choice.
Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 148 (1940).
198 See Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698,
700 (2011) (noting that "[v]irtually all federal civil statutes vest enforcement authority in a
federal agency").
199 See id (examining state enforcement of federal law).
200 Significant cases in this line include JI. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964),
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001), and
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
201 See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553 (1981);
Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding
the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 106-20 (2005) (discussing
advantages and disadvantages of private enforcement).
20 2 See FARHANG, supra note 2, at 5.
20 3 See David Freeman Engstrom, The Lost Origins ofAmerican Fair Employment Law:
Regulatory Choice and the Making of Modern Civil Rights, 1943-1972, 63 STAN. L. REV.
1071, 1076-77 (2011) (noting that "an important precondition of court-centered, private
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example of the legislative debate over the Interstate Commerce Act and the
Sherman Act, in which "legislators said explicitly that they were departing from
the default common law rules on attorney's fees and damages for the purpose of
mobilizing private litigants in the regulatory struggle to bring powerful
economic interests under control." 204 In short, decisions about the structure of
enforcement mechanisms reflect legislative determinations of how best to
achieve the underlying substantive goals of the regulatory scheme. I step back
here from distinctions between enforcement regimes to consider the effect of
the emerging procedural orientation of the federal courts on private enforcement
more broadly.
These private enforcement provisions are designed to encourage private
actors to bring suit to enforce the law-in fact, Congress regularly offers
various incentives to those willing to act as the private attorney general,
including enhanced damages and the availability of attorney's fees 205-but in
doing so they enlist the courts as partners in the work of governing. In these
settings, courts are the primary if not exclusive providers of state oversight of
the process of legal enforcement, 206 and the legislature can be understood to be
seeking judicial support for achieving the goals of the statutory scheme by
hearing claims that would otherwise not come before the court.
Private enforcement schemes align with the facilitating mechanisms of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well: provisions for notice pleading, for
discovery, and for class actions indicate that the federal courts serve not merely
to decide cases, but also to allow for plaintiffs to develop their claims such that
those claims may be decided on the basis of more complete information.207
Such provisions, which apply across regulatory and common law settings,
reveal an effort to govern by making use of the courts to promote the
achievement of the goals of substantive law, an orientation dramatically
different from one in which courts are open to hear disputes properly brought
before them but disclaim any role in a larger project of governing. 208 To be
clear, my point is that the logic of these orientations are opposed, such that the
enforcement is that the chief regulatory beneficiaries must be willing to relinquish control to
a combination of ideologically diverse judges, unpredictable juries, and litigants and counsel
seeking private advantage").
2 04 See FARHANG, supra note 2, at 64.
2 05 See id. at 60-68 (providing empirical study of Congress's use of these mechanisms);
see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-63 (1975)
(discussing history of legislative use of attorney's fees provisions).
206 In frameworks like Title VII, the agency also plays a role in the process of private
enforcement. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006) (providing that aggrieved persons must file a
charge with the EEOC (or state agency) and receive a right-to-sue letter before bringing
suit).207 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
208 See Paul D. Carrington, The American Tradition of Private Law Enforcement, 5
GERMAN L.J. 1413, 1413 (2004) ("American judicial institutions ... were not designed
merely to resolve civil disputes, but were fashioned for the additional purpose of facilitating
private enforcement of what in other nations would generally be denoted as public law.").
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Supreme Court has filled open interpretive space following an account at odds
with that underlying these provisions, and not that the Court has refused to
apply such provisions when they are straightforwardly applicable. Nonetheless,
the Court's emerging account has shaped, and has the potential to dramatically
affect, the project of governance directed by the political branches.
We can get a sense of the Court's orientation toward private enforcement by
examining the treatment of such provisions in standing doctrine, the setting in
which these questions have emerged most directly, often in the context of
claims against government officials. 209 The 1992 decision in Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildhife announces the current approach. 210 There, the Court denied standing
to an environmental group's effort to challenge the Secretary of the Interior's
interpretation of a provision of the Endangered Species Act that required
consultation with other agencies in certain circumstances, even though
Congress had authorized such an action in the statute. 211 The Court explained
its treatment of the "citizen suit" provision by insisting that
[t]o permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive
officers' compliance with the law into an "individual right" vindicable in the
courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the
Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed." 212
While the Lujan ruling constrains Congress's ability to deputize private
actors to ask the federal courts to make the executive branch enforce the law,213
the precise boundaries it sets are not entirely clear. Justice Kennedy concurred
in a separate opinion, joined by Justice Souter, (the "fifth" and "sixth" votes for
the outcome), to emphasize that "Congress has the power to define injuries and
articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where
none existed before," but that "[i]n exercising this power, . . . Congress must at
the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the
class of persons entitled to bring suit."214 This view, later incorporated into the
Court's ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA, 215 allows Congress to grant rights of
action so long as it specifies the injury and the set of permissible plaintiffs.
209 See Magill, supra note 56 (discussing development of treatment of standing in public
law claims).
210 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
211 The provision indicated that "'any person may commence a civil suit on his own
behalf... to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmental
instrumentality or agency ... who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this
chapter."' Id. at 571-72 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988)).
212Id. at 577 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).2 13 See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?: Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries,"
andArticle III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 217-18 (1992).
2 14 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
215 549 U.S. 497, 516-17 (2007).
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Decisions since Lujan indicate a strict though still somewhat hazy limit on
Congress's ability to leverage private enforcement as a means of ensuring that
the executive follows the law. 216
The Court has less often considered when private actors have standing to
bring suit against other private actors as a means of enforcing substantive
law. 2 17 In the 2000 decision in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services218 involving a claim under the Clean Water Act, the Court found that
the harm at issue was redressable (and that plaintiffs therefore had standing)
because where plaintiffs face ongoing illegal conduct, "a sanction that
effectively abates that conduct and prevents its recurrence provides a form of
redress." 219 And, the Court indicated, "[c]ivil penalties can fit that
description." 220 Justice Scalia raised the stakes in dissent, rejecting the
majority's analysis and contending that the Court's standing ruling "has grave
implications for democratic governance." 221 As he explained, "[b]y permitting
citizens to pursue civil penalties payable to the Federal Treasury, the Act does
not provide a mechanism for individual relief in any traditional sense, but turns
over to private citizens the function of enforcing the law."222 As a result,
"[e]lected officials are entirely deprived of their discretion to decide that a given
violation should not be the object of suit at all, or that the enforcement decision
216 See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009) (denying an
environmental group standing to challenge Forest Service notice, comment, and appeal
procedures based on an allegation of probabilistic injury); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20-21
(1998) (finding standing based on a congressionally granted right to information in a
challenge to an FEC determination).
217 Private enforcement can be seen to implicate action on behalf of the government in
either the government's sovereign capacity or its proprietary capacity. See Myriam E. Gilles,
Representational Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the Future ofPublic Law Litigation, 89
CALiF. L. REv. 315, 341-45 (2001) (discussing this distinction). In a 2000 decision, the
Court distinguished "the injury to [the Government's] sovereignty arising from violation of
its laws (which suffices to support a criminal lawsuit by the Government) and the proprietary
injury resulting from the alleged fraud." Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel.
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000). As Myriam Gilles explains, "when the government
suffers a proprietary injury, it is acting more as a private actor than as a governmental
entity," Gilles, supra, at 342 n.152; in other words, the proprietary harm is an injury to the
government "as the keeper of the public fisc and the owner of public property" id at 344.
The Court has ruled that qui tam provisions (which give the private enforcer a percentage of
any proceeds collected) allow for individual standing to bring suit on behalf of the
government's proprietary injuries. See Stevens, 529 U.S. at 769-70 (detailing recoveries
available to relators under the False Claims Act); id at 777-78. As noted above, because my
emphasis here is on questions of governing, I focus the discussion on plaintiffs acting on
behalf of the government's sovereign interests in enforcement of the law and do not address
qui tam suits.
218 528 U.S. 167 (2000); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83,
86 (1998) (raising an analogous private enforcement claim).
2 19 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 185-86.
220Id. at 186.
221 Id. at 202 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222Id. at 209.
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should be postponed."223 On this account, the private enforcement provision is
inherently incompatible with the proper roles of the executive and the courts.
There is a clear tension between the legislative reliance on private
enforcement and Justice Scalia's accounts in his Laidlaw dissent and the Lujan
opinion-as Professor Farhang emphasizes, a basic reason for private
enforcement is precisely to deprive the executive of discretion to decide that
certain violations should not be prosecuted. 224 But for Justice Scalia (and
Justice Thomas and maybe Justice Kennedy), private enforcement presents a
grave threat to democratic governance, 225 and violates not only Article III, but
potentially Article II as well, 226 serving "to place the immense power of suing
to enforce the public laws in private hands." 227 While the Court has not further
developed this point in the context of standing doctrine, the recent decisions
cohere with this account across a variety of civil procedure and federal courts
settings. Before evaluating the Court's approach, I sketch some implications of
the personal harm model in order to clarify the stakes of the assessment to
follow.
B. Implications of the Common Law Modelfor Private Enforcement
The Court's decisions privilege a certain kind of claim, one that looks like a
traditional common law claim raising a personal harm. The question is of
resemblance rather than identity: in practice, some common law claims will not
look like traditional common law claims (e.g., mass torts or consumer class
action claims), and some statutory claims may take a form akin to a common
law claim (e.g., some Title VII employment discrimination claims).228 As I
discuss below, the reliance on an idea of the basic mission of the federal courts
as responding to personal harms tracks a common law ideal of responding to
interpersonal duties and wrongs, the making and failure of interpersonal
223Id. at 210.224 See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
225 Notably, Justice Scalia has indicated that he sees no relevant difference between the
standing rules allowing private enforcement against state actors as opposed to against private
entities. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 103 n.5 (1998)
("[R]edressability-like the other prongs of the standing inquiry-does not depend on the
defendant's status as a governmental entity. There is no conceivable reason why it should.").
226 See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 209 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 197 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (reserving the question of whether "exactions of public fines by private litigants,
and the delegation of Executive power which might be inferable from the authorization, are
permissible in view of the responsibilities committed to the Executive by Article II"); see
also Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article II Nondelegation Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 781, 784 (2009) (developing the argument that by limiting private enforcement of
the law, standing doctrine protects individual liberty).
227 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 215 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
228 Cf Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011) (referring to employment
discrimination provision as a "federal tort").
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agreements, and the like.229 The account advanced in the recent cases invokes
an underlying vision of what it is that courts do, and shapes doctrine that would
limit the federal courts to doing just that.
Consistent with the logic of Justice Scalia's Laidlaw dissent, the upshot of
this framing is to privilege enforcement power by public authorities, which in
practice will usually be the executive. For Justice Scalia and those who side
with him, this is the point, as they contend that Article II vests the enforcement
power in the executive, and private enforcement of regulatory schemes is
therefore presumptively problematic, for both constitutional reasons and
concerns about the proper operation of democracy. 230 The question is thus when
and how Congress can allow private attorney generals to trigger judicial
involvement in the enforcement of federal law. What is at stake is the terms on
which the federal courts will allow themselves to be enlisted in regulatory
schemes, particularly the extent to which courts will facilitate the vindication of
claims or allow plaintiffs to remedy gaps in the statutory framework.
The allocation of public and private enforcement is not solely a decision
about who will enforce the statute but equally about how the law will be
enforced. Administrative agencies do not have to demonstrate standing when
Congress gives them enforcement authority,231 often do not need to aggregate
plaintiffs or confront class action concerns,232 and have subpoena power
allowing them to avoid pleading standards difficulties.233 Further, under various
administrative law regimes, the agency is given interpretive deference, 234 but a
private actor will not qualify for such deference. Public and private enforcement
thus differ in ways that may result in varying levels of effectuation of the
statutory program, not just because the agency may not bring some claims that
private actors would pursue (though that as well), but also because the claims
that are brought will be subject to a different framework of procedural scrutiny
than private claims.235 Highlighting the workings of this dynamic, Margaret
229 See infra Part V.A.
230 See generally Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of
the Separation ofPowers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881 (1983) (arguing that standing doctrine
is essential to separation of powers).
231 See Grove, supra note 226, at 792-94 (discussing cases in which "the Supreme Court
made it clear that the Executive Branch had standing to assert injuries that would not suffice
for a private plaintiff," id. at 792, at least when Congress confers standing).
232 See, e.g., Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 323 (1980) (concluding
that "Rule 23 is not applicable to an enforcement action brought by the EEOC in its own
name and pursuant to its authority under § 706 to prevent unlawful employment practices").233 As an example, the Federal Trade Commission is given broad investigatory powers.
See 15 U.S.C. § 49 (2006) (providing that "the Commission shall have power to require by
subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of all such
documentary evidence relating to any matter under investigation").
234 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
235 Public enforcement presents its own difficulties. See Adam S. Zimmerman,
Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 500, 518-56 (2011) (discussing challenges arising
when regulatory agencies attempt to organize compensation for mass harms, particularly
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Lemos has elucidated the ways in which the mix of private and public
enforcement has shaped the treatment of Title VII claims.236 Ultimately, then,
the Court's common law model directs enforcement of the law pursuant to the
logic of executive enforcement as well as the idiosyncrasies of executive
discretion. In this way, these procedure and justiciability rulings play a part in
shaping the operation of regulation and governing more broadly.
The recent cases thus raise questions about the proper role of the federal
courts in the context of regulatory programs: do the courts stand outside the
program and adjudicate disputes between private parties stemming from
legislatively defined harms, as well as state-directed enforcement, or can the
courts allow themselves to be enlisted alongside the legislature in the
achievement of the regulatory program, facilitating plaintiffs' efforts to bring
statutory claims? The procedural and justiciability decisions are ultimately
stand-ins for this fundamental question of governance.
In limiting the enforcement options and methodologies available to the
legislature, the approach signaled in these decisions threatens to constrain the
governance capacity of the federal government more broadly. Inasmuch as the
explicit provision for private enforcement speaks to a legislative belief that
allowing private actors to bring suit against regulated parties is a useful or
necessary means of achieving the objectives of the legislative program, the
cabining of this enforcement mechanism presumptively limits the effectiveness
of the program more broadly. As a result, these decisions may have marked
impact on the federal government's ability to effectively develop some
regulatory schemes, particularly those that do not yield claims that take a
personal harm form, such as aggregate or systemic claims, and that may benefit
from the availability of private enforcement, because of their political nature or
implications, or because of the desirability of distributed rather than uniform
enforcement. In short, to the extent provisions for private enforcement reflect a
legislative judgment as to the preferred means of accomplishing statutory goals,
decisions limiting the practical ability of private parties to bring such suits
strikes at the government's ability to achieve such goals.
If this common law role were actually what the Constitution required, the
fact that these innovations are useful or that these decisions limit the
legislature's governance capacity may be unfortunate, but may play little role in
the Court's analysis. But if this approach is invoked as a basic idea of "what
courts do," it is more problematic. We should therefore consider whether the
Court's approach reflects a persuasive and compelling account of the proper
role of the federal courts. I turn to this inquiry now.
because "agencies lack most of the procedural safeguards that exist in private litigation," id
at 518).
236 Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress's Choice of Delegate: Judicial
and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REv. 363, 380-92 (2010).
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V. A COMMON LAW COURT IN A REGULATORY WORLD
The Court's reliance on a personal harm account presents a traditional
common law ideal of the federal courts. The insistence on this framing at the
procedural stage diverges from the shift away from common law practice on the
merits and the increasing emphasis on statutory law. I characterize the Court's
approach as shaping a distinct role as a common law court in a regulatory
world. This Part explains and assesses this framing.
A. Leaving the Common Law
The source of the Court's self-identity as a forum for remedy of personal
harm is not mysterious. The American courts' origins in the English common
law (and equity) courts are familiar,237 and the establishment of the federal
courts at the Founding connects to that tradition.238 The important question is
the role of that common law model in structuring judicial access today. When
Chief Justice Roberts identifies "the most prototypical exercise of judicial
power" as the resolution of a common law claim,239 that may be true as a
historical matter, but it is not clear what this idea of prototypicality is supposed
to accomplish. In short, to what extent should this common law judicial role act
as a limitation on judicial power in the legal setting of our day?
The types of claims the common law traditionally encompasses, such as
doctrines of contract and tort and property, confirm its primary focus on
responding to personal harms.240 These familiar common law matters present a
model of interpersonal disputes seeking judicial resolution. While there have
always been some public law-like elements of the common law, such as public
2 37 See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause ofAction, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777,
784 (2004) ("Most of the states that ratified the Constitution adopted in some measure the
common law of England."). Of course, what exactly was included in the common law the
courts adopted is not entirely clear. See, e.g., Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account
of Its Reception in the United States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791, 797-816 (1951) (discussing
varying approaches to adoption of common law).
238 See Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 109 (1925) ("The statesmen and lawyers of the
Convention who submitted [the Constitution] to the ratification of the Conventions of the
thirteen States, were born and brought up in the atmosphere of the common law, and thought
and spoke in its vocabulary.").
239 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2615 (2011).
24 0 See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 516-17
(2003) (explaining that to "late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century jurists .. . tort was
the part of the civil side of common law that identified, and provided redress for, injurious
wrongs committed by a citizen-or, in certain instances, a state actor-against another");
Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 689, 693 (2004) (noting that "[r]ights at the core of [the private rights] category include
an individual's common law rights in property and bodily integrity, as well as in enforcing
contracts").
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nuisance law,24 1 such aggregate claims must be either premised on personal
harms or be brought by the state in its sovereign capacity,242 consistent with the
basic common law model. In short, the approach the Court has invoked in the
procedural setting tracks the basic contours of the traditional common law
account in its focus on a private individual harm as a trigger for judicial
involvement. When Justice Frankfurter insists that for the Framers of Article III,
"[j]udicial power could come into play only in matters that were the traditional
concern of the courts at Westminster and only if they arose in ways that to the
expert feel of lawyers constituted 'Cases' or 'Controversies,"' 243 he is
referencing a judicial power tied to a law largely concerned with disputes
between individuals. It is that model of the prototypical claim that shapes the
recent decisions.
Invocations of the common law implicate an array of distinct ideas and
practices, including the content of common law doctrines, the common law
method, and the ideas on which the common law is based, as well as the domain
of the common law in terms of the types of claims courts may consider.244 The
recent cases raise questions about the extent to which this last element can be
separated from the others. Can the substance of common law claims be
disconnected from common law methodology and common law procedure?
Does the continuing move away from the common law on the merits and on the
organizing logic of the legal system have implications for the continued reliance
on the common law model to shape judicial access?
These questions reflect that we no longer live in the common law world. It
is not news that the content of substantive law is increasingly diverging from
the common law. Numerous commentators have described the development of
the administrative or legislative state and have noted the diminishing space of
the common law.245 On one account, "[p]olicy formation has displaced the
24 1 See NOVAK, supra note 26, at 60-62 (discussing distinction between private and
public nuisance law and explaining that "[t]he common law of nuisance was one of the most
important public legal doctrines of nineteenth-century regulatory governance").
24 2 See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 240, at 701-04 (discussing standing to bring
public nuisance claims); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A (1977) (allowing
liability for group defamation only based on reference to a particular individual).
243 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the
judgment); see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing that Article III's limitations on the judicial
power mean that the federal court "will not decide a question unless the nature of the action
challenged, the kind of injury inflicted, and the relationship between the parties are such that
judicial determination is consonant with what was, generally speaking, the business of the
Colonial courts and the courts of Westminster when the Constitution was framed").
24 4 Cf Frederick Schauer, The Failure of the Common Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 765, 771
(2004) (noting that "the idea of the common law has numerous substantive as well as
methodological components").
245Id. at 765 ("Yet for all of our common law origins and for all of our persistent
celebration of the common law, there are important features of the common law that appear
to be in rapid retreat." (footnote omitted)).
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diffused and incremental operation of the common law as our primary means of
social regulation, and agencies have displaced common-law courts as the
primary means by which that regulation is effettuated." 246 This shift stems from
a number of factors, among them trends in the concept of democracy, the
growing complexity of society, and changes in governing ideology. 247 The
growth and greater prominence of the national government plays an important
part in the reduced emphasis on common law, inasmuch as there is for the most
part no federal general common law (at least since Erie),248 and the rise of
federal question jurisdiction since 1875 focuses the federal courts' attention on
statutory (and constitutional) law. 249
Significantly, the diminishing role of the common law takes form not only
in new settings of administrative governance, but within traditional common
law settings as well. Tort law presents a useful example here. During the
twentieth century, models of tort law premised on ideals of deterrence or
efficiency came to prominence, in contrast to the previous (often implicit) idea
of compensation for harm as the theoretical basis of tort liability.250 These
emerging ideals present a regulatory approach, where the doctrine is premised
not simply on the relationship between the parties, but on the broader allocation
246 Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L.
REv. 369, 369 (1989); see also GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STATUTES 1 (1982) (observing that in the last fifty to eighty years "we have gone from a
legal system dominated by the common law, divined by courts, to one in which statutes,
enacted by legislatures, have become the primary source of law").
247 See Novak, supra note 38, at 377 (indicating that "the rise of a distinctly modem
administrative regulatory state in the United States . .. was rooted in three interlinked
developments: the centralization of public power; the individualization of private right; and
the constitutionalization of the rule of law").
248 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("There is no federal general
common law."); cf Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law,
100 Nw. U. L. REv. 585, 594-614 (2006) (describing the "enclaves" of federal common
law).
249 See PURCELL, supra note 22, at 41 ("By the early twentieth century, actions based on
congressional enactments accounted for a substantial and growing part of the federal
caseload.").
250 See Goldberg, supra note 240, at 517-18 (explaining that pursuant to the "traditional
account" of tort law, meaning the model existing until the twentieth century, "[t]ort
was . . . conceived as a law of personal redress rather than as a law of public regulation or
punishment" and that tort suits "were understood as occasions to resolve disputes over
whether an actor (or actors) could be held responsible under the law for injuries suffered by
the plaintiff(s)"); id. at 519-21 (contending that "much of twentieth-century tort theory is
predicated on the notion that the traditional account could not survive" the challenges
presented by "changing material, political and intellectual conditions" and that "[t]he
traditional account-under which tort law was understood as a set of rules and concepts,
grounded in ordinary morality, for resolving disputes over alleged wrongs committed by A
against B-was no longer obviously in tune with modem realities or political and intellectual
sensibilities").
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of costs and incentives. 251 This move tracks the evolution of the torts
themselves, as the rise of industrial society and a national and international
consumer market gave rise to new forms of accidents and mass harms that
shaped developments in the doctrine and administrative practice. 252 Torts
scholars have in recent years advanced a theoretical paradigm centered, whether
as corrective justice or civil recourse theory, on the interpersonal duties
underlying the structure of tort law, returning, especially in the civil recourse
model, to a common law-style account. 253 The common law model thus now
appears as one competing orientation to the field. Catherine Sharkey has
demonstrated how in the administrative preemption setting the Supreme Court
"has oscillated between competing conceptions of tort as either primarily
regulatory or compensatory." 254 This doctrinal and philosophical debate
highlights the departure from the classical common law model in shaping the
understanding and operation of tort law.
We can likewise see how the evolving regulatory state has unsettled the
common law treatment of torts at the level of its practical operation, both
engulfing it directly through regulation and undermining it through facilitation
mechanisms. The rise of regulatory preemption exemplifies this dynamic,
prominently in cases questioning whether regulatory approval or a
manufacturer's compliance with agency safety specifications preempts state tort
law claims. In this messy area of law, where statutes often prove unhelpful, 255
one move that can be discerned, and has been highlighted by Professor
Sharkey, 256 is the recurring judicial emphasis on the agency's structuring of the
regulatory scheme, essentially asking whether the agency's approach leaves
room for the common law remedy. The divergent results in Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co. 257 in 2000 and Williamson v. Mazda, Inc.258 in 2011 provide
251 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for
Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 69, 73 (1975) (describing four goals of the law of torts:
"two 'compensation goals'-spreading and distributional equity-and two 'deterrence
goals'-specific or collective deterrence and general or market deterrence").
252 See generally JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED
WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2004)
(detailing the development of American tort law from the problem of industrial accidents).
253 See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L.
REv. 917, 919 (2010) ("To study torts is to learn what sort of conduct our legal system
defines as wrongfully injurious toward another such that, when committed, the victim is
entitled to exact something from the wrongdoer.").
254 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional
Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 449, 459-71 (2008).
255 See id. at 450 (noting that "Congress repeatedly punts, leaving unresolved the key
question of the extent to which federal standards and regulations preempt state common-law
remedies").
256 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: "Agency-Forcing" Measures,
58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2128 (2009) (noting that "federal agencies have become the real
decisionmakers in preemption controversies" and that "Congress has taken a back seat to
federal agencies on critical questions of preemption").
257 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
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a notable example of this inquiry, concluding, in two cases addressing the same
regulatory scheme, that the regulation at issue in the former preempted common
law tort claims, but that in the latter did not. We see an analogous dynamic in
the opposed results of Wyeth v. Levine 259 and PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,26 0
decided two years apart and turning on the particular provisions of the federal
statutory and regulatory drug labeling programs. The point is not that common
law remedies have disappeared but instead, perhaps more strikingly, that they
have come to be evaluated as components of a broader regulatory program.
The rise in mass torts and the evolution of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure have yielded an increasing number of class action or other
aggregated tort claims. Such claims do not fit well with a traditional common
law account of tort law, looking more like a type of public law. Indeed, scholars
have advanced accounts presenting mass tort class actions as taking legislative
or administrative form or as themselves regulatory mechanisms.26 1 Likewise,
commentators have argued that by involving public officials in the processes of
settlement, the Class Action Fairness Act treats class actions as a type of public
law litigation.262 These arguments have been vigorously criticized, often based
258 Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1139 (2011) (noting that
in Geier, "the regulation's history, the agency's contemporaneous explanation, and its
consistently held interpretive views indicated that the regulation sought to maintain
manufacturer choice in order to further significant regulatory objectives," but that "[h]ere,
these same considerations indicate the contrary").
259 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).2 60 PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2581-82 (2011) (indicating that despite
obvious similarities, the case differed from Wyeth because of the particulars of the federal
regulatory scheme at issue).
261 See Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out of Class
Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1057, 1060 (2002) (noting that "there is increasing
skepticism over the view that a class action is simply an unaltered aggregation of individual
claims" and contending that "[c]lasses do take on the form of an 'entity,' . . .with rather
immediate consequences for the prospect of successful prosecution of a claim" (footnote
omitted)); Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class
Action, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 149, 152-53 (2003) (arguing that "the class action-with its
tendency toward settlement at the behest of self-appointed agents for the class-has emerged
not simply as a procedural supplement to preexisting law but, rather, as an institutional rival
to the ordinary process of lawmaking itself'); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in
Mass Exposure Cases: A 'Public Law' Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 849, 859
(1984) (arguing that by "enlarging the judicial inquiry from the particular case and its parties
to the aggregate of similar cases and similarly situated parties, a public law approach would
enable courts to overcome the problems posed by systematic causal indeterminacy"); David
L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 913,
917-18 (1998) (arguing "that the notion of the class as entity should prevail over more
individually oriented notions of aggregate litigation").
262 See Alexandra D. Lahav, Are Class Actions Unconstitutional?, 109 MICH. L. REV.
993, 1001 (2011) (contending that "CAFA also signals that Congress understands the class
action to be a form of public law litigation" as the settlement notice provision "demonstrates
mistrust of private lawyers as well as the importance of class actions for the enforcement of
socially beneficial laws"); Catherine M. Sharkey, CAFA Settlement Notice Provision:
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on a commitment to the individual day in court ideal stemming from due
process guarantees. 263 Here too, we see robust academic debate and some
judicial and political movement away from the basic common law ideal in tort
settings.
Alongside these developments surrounding the content of common law
doctrine, the common law model has been challenged at the level of method as
well. Traditionally, common law courts seek to identify what custom and legal
practice dictate through application of precedent to particular cases. 264 This
approach, which places the courts in a "law-saying" role without grounding in
an authoritative text,265 depends on the specificity of the claim before the court
to uncover the law.266 Under the common law system, then, the nature of the
cases judges will hear is closely connected to the way the courts will approach
those claims on the merits.
This idea of judge-made (or judge-discovered) law has fallen out of favor in
our era, and we see now a broad preference for law traceable to democratic
processes, with accompanying limitations on courts.267 The shift to a statutory
focus on the merits has been accompanied by departures from common law
methodology, such as the reliance on textualist doctrines. 268 To be sure, these
Optimal Regulatory Policy?, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1971, 1975, 1980 (2008) (indicating, in
discussing "CAFA as regulatory policy," that "[t]he settlement notice provision creates a
mechanism for public oversight of private litigation and thus an opportunity for cooperative
regulation spurred by public and private parties").
263 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy,
and the Foundations ofProcedural Due Process, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1588-1603 (2007)
(arguing for incompatibility of "entity" view of class actions with due process guarantees);
see also Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 265, 312-18 (2011) (arguing for the importance of individual consent as
against the American Law Institute's advance consent aggregate settlement proposal).
264 See Brian Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND
COMMON LAW 8, 20 (William Twining ed., 1986) (describing the common law system to
consist "of a body of practices observed and ideas received over time by a caste of lawyers,
these ideas being used by them as providing guidance in what is conceived to be the rational
determination of disputes litigated before them, or by them on behalf of clients, and in other
contexts").
2 6 5 See GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 9 (1986)
(explaining that under classical common law theory, "[t]he office of the judge is not to
make, but publicly to expound and declare, the law: jus dicere notjus dare").
266 See id. at 36 (observing that under common law theory "the principles [of law] are
uncovered through reflection on the particular cases-through experience and the reflection
of many on that experience-and not through a priori reasoning").
267 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 9 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)
(indicating that the development of the common law "would be an unqualified good, were it
not for a trend in government that has developed in recent centuries, called democracy").
268 In a series of articles, Peter Strauss has examined the Court's departure from
common law methods in its treatment of statutes. See generally Peter L. Strauss, The
Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 225 (1999); Peter L. Strauss, Courts or
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methodological moves have been much criticized and are not as consolidated as
the move away from the common law on the merits. Still, the regular
disparaging of common law method-even by those most insistent on the
common law framing at the procedural stage 269-- challenges the reliance on the
common law procedural model. To the extent the fundamental nature of the
courts that the Court has invoked is a model intimately tied to the substance and
methodology of the common law, the divergence of these models calls for
careful assessment of the Court's approach.
B. Examining the Common Law Judicial Role
As this discussion shows, while the demand for a common law-like claim
evokes an account of the role of the federal courts stemming from the era of the
Framing, both the content and methodology of the law today differ dramatically
from that before the courts of that time.270 We can understand the Court's
procedural moves to shape a judicial role as a common law court in a statutory
and regulatory environment. My claim is not that the Court is making a basic
error of fit by adopting a procedural model unsuited to the substantive law
setting in which it acts-though it may be, as the procedural framework of the
common law was closely connected to the content and method of that law-but
that a role as a common law court in a regulatory world is a distinct judicial
orientation which can and should be assessed on its own terms.
Justice Kennedy's "Council of Revision" argument from ACSTO v. Winn
reflects an approach motivated largely by concerns about legitimacy, especially
the legitimacy of judicial oversight of state action.271 The idea is that the power
of law-saying can be exercised only in response to disputes arising from harms
inflicted directly on individuals, perhaps because only such a harm justifies the
departure from the democratic process into the courts, as Justice Scalia has
argued.272 On this account, the Court employs the common law framing as a
legitimating resource: to the extent justification for judicial involvement is
necessary, the Court indicates that the presence of common law-style harms-
and only the presence of such harms-suffices to provide that legitimacy. This
point highlights a striking discrepancy between a disappearing world in which
Tribunals? Federal Courts and the Common Law, 53 ALA. L. REV. 891 (2002); Peter L.
Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 429
(1995).269 See supra note 14 (noting contending positions on this point by Justice Scalia).
270 C( Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731,
742 (2010) (arguing that "important aspects of the intellectual world of the Founders have
wholly vanished, rendering greatly problematic any originalist understanding of the
Supremacy Clause").
271 See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.272 See Scalia, supra note 230, at 895 (arguing that only concrete injury "can separate
the plaintiff from all the rest of us who also claim benefit of the social contract, and can thus
entitle him to some special protection from the democratic manner in which we ordinarily
run our social-contractual affairs").
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judicial development of the common law was uniquely legitimating, to an
extent even greater than statutes,273 and our present day vision in which
democratic processes are widely preferred, but common law frameworks of
judicial access retain their pull.
To illustrate, pursuant to the Court's approach, plaintiffs in the Winn case
would have had standing if they had suffered a direct financial harm, and the
Court would have then considered the constitutionality of the state program.
The same dynamic is present in Sprint, where the Justices appear to agree that
APCC would have had standing if they stood to win even one dollar.274 As the
presence of such harms would have little effect on the underlying claims in
these cases, the formality of the lines drawn on a model of private individual
harm serves to entrench the judicial role in the familiar common law terms,
even in contexts diverging dramatically from traditional common law settings.
Though I present the Court's actions in terms of a somewhat formalist
account of the judicial role, the reliance on formalist methods is not itself the
point, but rather what the Court is being formalistic about. The cases suggest a
vision of legitimacy that attaches at the initial invocation of the federal courts:
the court can be activated only by plaintiffs raising certain kinds of claims, but
once the court is properly activated by a personally harmed plaintiff, it is free to
decide. Here, the job of the federal courts is to resolve certain kinds of claims,
and any broader interest in promoting effective or efficient enforcement of the
law is not their concern. Once a court is considering a claim of the proper sort,
those may be relevant interests to further, but the recent cases indicate these
goals are secondary to the basic ideal of policing the parameters of the judicial
role and resolving disputes that fall within that role. As this is true even where
the nature of the plaintiff s interest would have no practical effect on the court's
consideration of the claim,275 we can see that the issue is not one of judicial
2 73 See Kunal M. Parker, Law "In" and "As" History: The Common Law in the
American Polity, 1790-1900, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REv. 587, 594-607 (2011) (developing
argument that "the law-politics problem as we imagine it today ... was not a problem for
many nineteenth-century Americans," id at 596, and detailing nineteenth-century treatment
of common law).
2 74 See Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 289 (2008) ("Were
we to agree with petitioners that the aggregators lack standing, our holding could easily be
overcome. For example, the Agreement could be rewritten to give the aggregator a tiny
portion of the assigned claim itself, perhaps only a dollar or two."); id. at 305 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) ("Perhaps it is true that a 'dollar or two' . . . would give respondents a sufficient
stake in the litigation. Article III is worth a dollar.").
2 75 See David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding Concrete
Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 808, 809-14 (2004) (making this
point with reference to the challenge to the Line Item Veto Act in Clinton v. City of New
York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)); Daniel A. Farber, Standing on Hot Air: American Electric
Power and the Bankruptcy of Standing Doctrine, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 121, 123 (2011),
http://yalelawjoumal.org/2011/09/13/farber.html (noting, as "another key problem with
standing doctrine" and with reference to American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131
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competence or epistemic authority, but is instead a commitment to a particular
account of the legitimacy of judicial action. The upshot is that drawing the
judicial access line based on the nature of the courts as resolving common law-
type disputes distances the courts from the political branches' governing efforts.
In limiting the possibilities for private enforcement through the courts as a
means of effectuating regulatory programs, the approach embodied in the recent
cases disavows a judicial role as a co-participant in promoting achievement of
the substantive goals of the law, yielding a stance apart from rather than
alongside the political branches. While the federal courts are not Congress's
agents to be drafted into assistance in legislative projects, this disposition
reflects a Court going the other way in shaping a particular judicial role in an
evolving governing environment. By privileging executive participation in the
enforcement of substantive law, the Court places a brake on the processes of
governance precisely in the contexts of aggregate harm in which some form of
state intervention are most needed, based on a model of law it has left behind in
other settings.
What is lost in the Court's common law model is the type of governing-
facilitating role inherent in the private enforcement approach, a model implicit
to some extent in the twentieth-century development of the law of courts. This
role leverages the distinct adjudicative capacities of the federal courts to play a
part in the enforcement of substantive law and decouples appropriate judicial
involvement from a close focus on the personally harmed individual to, instead,
the nature of the underlying regulatory program and the terms of judicial
participation in that project. Where Congress has affirmatively sought judicial
involvement, and where claims are presented in a manner suited for judicial
engagement (with adverse parties, addressing the interpretation of a statute, and
seeking legislatively specified remedies, for example), the question of
legitimacy takes a new and distinct form which the common law model cannot
resolve.
As the discussion in Part II demonstrates, the role of the federal courts and
their accompanying doctrinal practices, both procedural and substantive, have
evolved throughout American history in response to and alongside the
developments of the time. Accordingly, concerns about the Court's
retrenchment in these cases stem not solely from the identification of the
fundamental nature of the federal courts as resolving common law-like disputes,
but from the accompanying idea of there being an inherent nature of the federal
courts at all. As the law the courts confront continues to evolve, the terms of
judicial involvement might continue to change as well.
S. Ct. 2527 (2011), that "the 'injury' that forms the basis for Article M standing does not
need to have any logical connection with the legal claim").
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VI. CONCLUSION
While my aim in this Article has not been to present a concrete alternative
proposal for how the judicial role should be envisioned and implemented today,
I offer a first step towards such an account in concluding. When considering the
terms of access to the federal courts, a primary focus should be on the
institutional dynamics of the relevant legal framework, reflecting the
democratic distribution of enforcement capacity, the particulars of judicial
competence and legitimacy, and the means of promoting effective governing.
Such an approach would move away from a "fundamental attributes of the
federal courts" model towards an engagement with the other branches in the
work of governance, taking concerns about judicial overreach and democratic
control seriously but accommodating a role for the federal courts in the work of
governing. In doing so, it would not function as a unitary rule for structuring
judicial involvement but would allow variation across settings. Much as the
Court has indicated that efficiency concerns are best dealt with in the treatment
of the claim rather than by denying the plaintiff a day in court,276 so too
evaluations of the judicial role might take closer account of the content of the
substantive legal framework at issue when identifying what it is the federal
courts do.
276 See supra text accompanying notes 144-51.
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